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HomeMy WebLinkAbout09/24/1942 , ." SWC:A-104 SUFFOLK COUNTY WAR COUNCIL Office of the Director of Civilian Protection Griffing Avenue Riverhead, New York September 24, 1942 TO: Deputy County Directors of Civilian Protection FROM: Oounty Director of Civilian Protection SUBJECT I pRACTICE OR AC'l'Il'AL BAlDS As per prior informa"tion to you, and through the press to the citizenry of Suffolk Oounty, it is common knowledge that once a month we may expect either a practice blackout or practice daylight alert. The calls for such practice alerts emanate in Albany and are given to Oontrol Centre with the words "Practice Alert" included in the message. We in turn contact your Report Centre giving you the words ,"Practice Alert" in the message also. When you receive a call from this office and the words "Practice Alert" are not included, you may be certain that it is an official alert which has come in over the Army phone, and as far as we are concerned, it is an actual raid. On the evening of September 22nd, this office received a BLUE signal which was promptly transmitted to each Report Centre. This came in on the Army wire, and as far as we knew, was the real thing. However, had the BLUE signal been succeeded by a RED, all of the incidents which you have arranged for our monthly practice alert would have been activated. This is a situation which must in some way be remedied. It seems to me that the only way you may be able to control the starting of incidents woulli be by phone. I know that all of us want to hold down the number of phone calls to an absolute minimum, but, at the same time, we do not want practice incidents started during an official Army alert. I would strongly suggest that, starting October 1st, you arrange your incidents as you have in the past with this proviso, that no incident be activated anywhere within your jurisdiction until you have calle d the person who is responsible for starting the incident, giving him definite instruction to "start the ball rolling". This is going to mean more phone calls, and I. would further suggest that instead ot having a great many incidents scattered throughout tour area, that you cut the number down, and increase the need for additional equi~ent and personnel; thus necessitating the dispatch of additional equipment and personnel from adjacent areas Another situation arose on the evening of September 22nd which also needs some thought, In a great many instances, Civilian Protection personnel heard the radio go off the air and. realizing that the reason radios go off is because they are so ordered by the Firat Fighter Command, decided that the best thing for them to do was to get to their post of duty without notification from either this offioe or your own. personally, I think this attitude on the part of our personnel is to be com- mended as it shows that they are on their toes at a momentls notice. However, the problem arises as to what to do with them or how to notify them when both we and you receive the WHITE or "All Olear" signal. Inasmuch as the RED did not come through, and therefore no public alarm was sounded, we could not sound the "All Clear". This was done in one seotion Up-State who had received the BLUE just as we did, and realizing that they had a great many of their personnel mobilized, blew the "All Clear". This was badly misinterpreted -. some of the citizenry thinking it 'flas a blackout, pror.tptly blacked out, while others thought it was a regular fire alarm, cauaing more confusion. The answer to this' problem is this I when our personnel hear the radio go off the air and on their own violition report to their post of duty should also try, if at all possible, to learn when the radio comes on again, which would be an ili1dica- tion that the "All Clear" has come through. They could then proceed back to their homes, places of business, etc. - 1 - I , . SllC:A-I04 - 2 - September 24, 1942 I have yet to find a way to notify all of our thousands of Civilian Protection personnel that when the siren blows, it is raal or practice. If all of the com- nunitios of Suffolk Oounty had air horuB this could be done by blowing different nunbers for a practice or a real raid, but inasnuch as the great majority of our alarn systeos are sirens, it is not practical. . Therefore, every time the siren blows, it is to be considered by our personnel that a real raid is in progress, and incidents should be started by your Report Centre c~lling personnel or persons responsible for starting them off. Technically speaking, Civilian Protection personnel should not Mobilize until the sirens let go with an air raid alarm, as it is conceivable that between the time the radio goes off the air and we in Riverhead receive the YELLOW, BLUE or RED signal, the trouble could have been cleared up, and no calls would be necessary. /hf FLOYD D. HOUSTON Director Civilian Protection ,