HomeMy WebLinkAboutCross Sound Ferry DocumentsINDEX No. 24900-97
CAL. No.
SUPREME COURT - STATE OF NEW YORK
PART 17 SUFFOLK COUNTY
PRESENT:
Hon. JOHN I. DUNN
Justice of the Supreme Court
X
CROSS SOUND FERRY SERVICES, INC., :
:
Plaintiff, :
:
-against- :
:
THE TOWN OF SOUTHOLD, THE TOWN BOARD :
OF THE TOWN OF SOUTHOLD and THE PLANNING:
BOARD OF THE TOWN OF SOUTHOLD, :
:
Defendants. :
X
MOTION DATE 12/14/98
ADJ. DATES 10/12/99
Mot. Seq. g005 MOT D; 006 XMD CASEDISP
ESSEKS, HEFTER & ANGEL
Attys. for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 279
Riverhea~l, NY 11901
SMITH, FINKELSTEIN, LUNDBERG, ISLER &
YAKABOWSKI
Attorneys for Defendants
456 Griffing Ave.
Riverhead, NY 11901
Upon the following papers numbered 1 to 27 read on this motion oursuant to CPLR 3212; cross motion pursuant to CPLR
3211 (a)(4. 5.7); Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cause and supporting papers 1 to 15; Notice of Cross Motion and supporting
papers 16-19; Answering Affidavits and supporting papers 20-27; Replying Affidavits and supporting papers __; Other ; (.~,,d
afro., h~...ui.l~ ~.~,,,~,.I i. ~,ppo, t ,md ,4-+'~,~-d to fl~c ~,~.ofiu,) it is,
ORDERED that this motion and cross-motion are determined as set forth herein:
Plaintiff commenced this action for a judgment declaring certain provisions of the Town Code
unconstitutional, facially and as applied, and for an injunction permanently enjoining the Town fi.om enforcing
the challenged provisions. Before the Court are a motion by plaintiff for summary judgment, and a cross-
motion by defendants for dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds: (1) there is a prior action
pending between the parties for the same relief; (2) the complaint falls to state a cause of action; (3) plaintiff
has waived its right to challenge the code provision; and (4) no justiciable controversy exists.
By way of a brief background, plaintiffis licensed by the Interstate Commeme Commission to operate
a ferry service between Orient Point, New York and New London, Connecticut, for the transport of passengers,
vehicles and cargo. As of 1995 five ferry boats were in operation, making an average of eight daily round trips
during the winter and 20 during the summer. In July of 1995 plaintiffput into service a high-speed passenger-
only ferry, adding six daily round trips during the months of April to November. Shortly thereafter, the Town
commenced an action (Index No. 16263-95) seeking to enjoin Cross Sound Ferry fi.om operating the passenger-
only service and utilizing an area east of its property for parking until it obtained site plan approval. A
preliminary injunction was denied. Subsequently, in the wake of proceedings in both actions, this Court
imposed a stay upon the injunctive action, pending a determination of the issues in this action. The instant
submissions bring those issues before the Court.
Although the affirmation accompanying the notice of cross-motion lacks an organized argument
addressed to the grounds for dismissal, the Court begins by examining the grounds enumerated in the notice.
Cross Sound Ferry v Town of Southold
Index No. 24900-97
Page 2
(1) To succeed on the basis of another action pending, the other action must be "for the same cause of
action" (CPLR 3211[a][4]). The two actions between these parties are related in that they both concern the
same property; however, they do not seek the same relief. Moreover, defendants in this action previously
moved to dismiss the complaint on this same ground; that motion was denied (order dated May 6, 1998) and
no appeal was taken. Under the doctrine of the "law of the case," the prior determination "should be the end
of the matter as far as Judges and courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction are concemed" (Martin v City of Cohoes,
37 NY2d 162, 371 NYS2d 687 [ 1975 ]) and defendants are precluded from relitigating the issue (Haibi v Haibi,
171 AD2d 842, 567 NYS2d 778, 779 [2d Dept 1991]).
(2,3) The gist of the argument presented by defendants is that the complaint "does not state a claim for
relief' [because] "plaintiffhas waived by its representations to the Planning Board and to the court ... its fight
to maintain the challenge [to the code provisions] ... and it should be estopped by its conduct from pursuing"
the claim. The conduct referred to is the submission of a site plan to the Planning Board; however, plaintiff
asserts this was done only "as an offer of compromise, in keeping with the direction" of this Court to attempt
to settle the dispute. Moreover, plaintiffhas shown that each submission to the Planning Board has been "with
prejudice" and with an express reservation of"ail fights and claims to all pre-existing legal, conforming and/or
n0n-confor~ng uses."
"Actions taken.., for the stated purpose of arriving at a settlement agreement, ... which actions would
not have been accomplished except in a mutual attempt to reach a settlement, should ... be protected" pursuant
to the public policy of encouraging attempts at settlement (Crow-Crirarnins-Wolff& Munier v County of
[I~estchester, 126 AD2d 696, 511 NYS2d 117, 119 [2d Dept 1987]). Accordingly, neither waiver nor estoppel
will apply to prevent plaintiff from pursuing its challenge to the code provisions.
As for not stating a claim for relief, it is well settled that a declaratoryj udgment action is the appropriate
vehicle by which to attack the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance (see, e.g., Peekskill Sttbltrbs, Inc. v
Morabito, 74 AD2d 843,425 NYS2d 389, 390 [2d Dept 1980]).
(4) A justiciable controversy has been defined as "a real dispute between adverse parties, involving
substantial legal interests, for which a declaration of fights will have some practical effect" (Downev Rothman,
215 AD2d 716, 627 NYS2d 424 [2d Dept 1995]). Defendants' position that no justiciable controversy exists
ignores the fact that the parties herein have taken adverse positions with respect to the code requirement for a
site plan; that each has a substantial legal interest at stake; and that a declaration of rights will most certainly
affect their exercise of those rights. Rather than explaining or developing their position, defendants simply state
that they "should not be bound" by a decision of the Town Justice declaring §100-250 "void ... [as]
unconstitutionally vague..." because the Planning Board did not have a full and fair oppommity to litigate the
matter in that action.~ Strangely, defendants do not now take advantage of the opportunity to litigate the issue;
their submission presents no argument in support of the validity of the challenged sections of the code.
1The declaration was made in a criminal matter based upon an alleged
violation of the section: People of the State of New York v W.J.I. Holding
Corp., Docket NO. 96070305, order of Southold Town Justice William H. Price,
Jr., dated April 13, 1998.
~ross Sound Ferry v Town of Southold
Index No. 24900-97
Page 3
The Court finds no merit to the asserted grounds for dismissal and further finds the "arguments" offered
to be mere statements that are conclusory in nature and without foundation in fact or law. The cross-motion
is denied.
Plaintiff challenges two provisions in Article XXV, entitled "Site Plan Approval," of Chapter 100,
which sets forth the zoning regulations of the Town Code. The Court begins with consideration of § 100-253A
as amended by Local Law No. 8-1995. Entitled "Approval of site plan required," it provides, in part:
No building permit shall be issued for any structure or building for which use a
site plan is [required] pursuant to this Chapter 100, until a determination has
been made by the Planning Board as to whether a site plan or an amendment
thereto is required (emphasis added).
Plaintiff contends that the delegation of authority to the Planning Board to determine whether a site plan is
required is invalid because it is beyond the power of the Town Board to delegate "interpretive authority" to the
Planning Board.
Analysis begins with the principle that a municipality's power to regulate land use is derived from the
State in the form of enabling legislation which defines the extent to which the power may be exercised
(Moriarty v Planning Board of the Village of $1oatsburg, 199 AD2d 188, 506 NYS2d 184, 188 [2d Dept
1986], app den 'd 69 NY2d 603, 512 NYS2d 1026). With respect to approval of site plans by a town, the
enabling legislation is Town Law §274-a, subdivision 2(a). As relevant to this matter, it provides as follows:
The town board may, as part of a zoning ordinance or local law adopted pursuant to this article
... authorize the planning board or such other administrative body ... to review and approve,
approve with modifications or disapprove site plans prepared to specifications set forth in the
ordinance or local law.
The Courts have consistently held that "each local agency involved in the zoning and planning process
may not exceed the bounds of the power specifically delegated to it" (see examples, Moriarty v Planning
Board, supra, 506 NYS2d at 189-190). With respect to site plan review, the enabling legislation permits a
town board to delegate to a planning board the power to (1) review and approve, (2) [review and] approve with
modifications, and (3) [review and] disapprove site plans. Hence when the Town Board amended § 100-253A
of the Town Code to authorize the Planning Board to make a "determination ... as to whether a site plan ... is
required," it exceeded the bounds of power delegated to it in the enabling legislation. That determination can
only be made by reference to, and interpretation of the zoning code; and the power to interpret is vested in the
building inspector and the Zoning Board of Appeals (Moriarty v Planning Board, supra, 506 NYS2d at 190;
Figgielnternational, Inc. v Town of Huntington, 203 AD2d 416, 610 NYS2d 563,565 [2d Dept 1994]).
Therefore, the section as amended is invalid.
Plaintiff's challenge to the constitutionality of § 100-250 raises a different question. The section is the
first in Article XXV and is entitled "Applicability." It applies to "every land use that is permitted in the Town
o.f Southold," with the exception of a single-family home and "customary nonagricultural accessory uses to a
s~ngle-family residential use...". The particular language at issue is the following:
Any change in use or intensity of use which will affect the characteristics of
the site in terms ofparklng, loading, access, drainage, open space or utilities
~Cross Sound Ferry v Town of Southold
Index No. 24900-97
Page 4
will require site plan approval. In all cases where this chapter requires
approval of site development plans by the Planning Board, no building permit
shall be issued by the Building Inspector except upon authorization of and in
conformity with the site plan approval by the Planning Board and all other
public agencies involved.
Plaintiff contends that the requirement for site plan approval is "so broad and indefinite that it sweeps before
the Planning Board every aspect of evolving commercial life in the Town." Plaintiffargues that the failure of
the section "to provide any standard for determining whether even the most minor change o fuse ... is covered
by the broad sweep of its language creates uncertainty and invites arbitrary application of the law."
When a statute is challenged as void for vagueness, the Court must examine its language and apply an
objective test. The sole issue is whether a reasonable person subject to the statute would understand what the
law requires. "Consequently, a statute is either impermissibly vague or not vague, in relation to the world at
large. A statute therefore cannot be void for vagueness as applied to any individual" (People v Hirsch, 140
Misc2d 881,531 NYS2d 865, 867 [Kings Co 1988]).
Initially, the Court is struck by the fact that sections 100-250 and I00-253 both contain language
referring to instances ("in ail cases" and "any structure or building") for which site plan approval is required
by this chapter. There is no section in Article XXV which succinctly sets forth the uses, structures or buildings
for which site plan approval is required (apart fi:om the opening of § 100-250, "This Article shall apply to every
land use," etc.). In contrast, a model ordinance for site plan review begins by stating, "In all districts, site ...
plan approval by the Planning Commission shall be required for," followed by an enumeration of four types
of buildings and uses (Anderson, 2 New YorkZoningLaw and Practice, 3d ed., §30.58, pp. 592-593). The third
item in that list is: "any change in use or intensity of use which will affect the characteristics of the site in terms
of parking, loading, access, drainage, utilities or other city services," language which is identical to the section
at issue. The plaintiff's introduction of a new service clearly had an effect on parking at the site. Hence
regardless of whatever other shortcomings may be found in the section, the Court does not find it to be so
impermissibly vague as to be unconstitutional.
In accordance with the above, the Court finds and declares:
(1) that §100-253 of the Code of the Town of Southold, as emended to authorize the Planning Board
to determine whether a site plan or amendment thereto is -required, is invalid in that the Town Board has no
power to delegate such authority;
(2) that §100-250 of the Code of the Town of Southold is not so impermissibly vague as to be
unconstitutional on its face; and
(3) the Town of Southold has the right to require Cross Sound Ferry to submit a site plan in connection
with its introduction of a passenger-only ferry service.
Dated: ' -
INDEX No.
96-26389
SUPREME COURT- STATE OFNEWYORK
IASPARTI7 SUFFOLK COUNTY
PRESENT:.
Hon. IOHN J. DUNN
lustice of the Supreme Court
In the Matter of the Application of
CROSS SOUND FERRY SERVICES, INC. and
ADAM C. WRONOWSKI, individually and as
Custodian for JESSICA WRONOWSKI under the
Connecticut UGMA,
Petitioners,
for a Judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil
Practice Law and Rules
-ag~nst-
X
MOTION DATE 5/18198
ADJ. DATES I0/12/99
Mot. Seq. # 005 - IVID; CASEDISP
ESSEKS, HEFTER & ANGEL
Attorneys for Petitioners
P.O. Box 279, 108 East Main Street
Riverhead, NY 11901
SMITH, FINKELSTEIN, LUNDBERG
ISLER and YAKABOSKI, LLP
Attorneys for Respondent Planning Board
456 Griffing Avenue, P.O. Box 389
Riverhead, NY 11901
PLANNING BOARD OF THE TOWN OF
SOUTHOLD,
Respondent,
- and -
SOUTHOLD CITIZENS FOR SAFE ROADS, INC.,:
WlCKH2LM, WlCKI4_~M & BKESSLER
Attorneys for Resp-Intvnr. Southold Citizens
10315 Main Road, P.O. Box 1424
Mattituck, NY 11952
Respondent-Intervenor.:
Upon the following papers numbered I to 10 read on this motion pursuam to CPLR 222 I: Notice of Motion/
Order to Show Cause and supporting papers I - ,t : Notice of Cross Motion and ~upporting papers :
Answering Affidavits and supporting papers 5 - 8 : Replying Affidavits and supporting papers 9 - 10 :
Other : (,hid ~'t, cz I~-~.i,,~ eo~k*¢l in ~,vvotl ,u,d ~pvo~d ~ th~ iuo~ioa) it is.
ORDERED that this motion by petitioners is denied.
On motions by respondent and the intervenor-respondent, this court dismissed two article 78
p oce?ngs :n which petmoner challenged a SEQRA pomuve declarauon ,ssued by rest]ondent (Index No.
96-26089) and a resolution adopting a scoping outline (Index No. 97-13 I2) (order dated March 26, 1998)
Cr ~.~ Sound Ferry v Southold Planning Board
Index No. 96-26389
Page 2
By the instant application petitioners seek leave to renew and reargue the motions, requiring the court to
determine which vehicle is appropriate~ (see, Chiarella v Quitoni, 178 AD2d 502, 577 NYS2d 429 [2d Dept
19911).
The device of ranewal affords a party an opportunity to present new or additional facts that were
unknown at the time of the original motion (~lliam P. PahlEquipment Corp. v Jassls, 182 AD2d 22, 588
NYS2d 8, 11 [1" Dept 1992]). The only new fact presented herein is that the Town Justice has declared a
certain provision of the Town Code unconstitutional. The code provision has no bearing on either the
SEQRA proceedings challenged by petitioner or the grounds for dismissing the petitions.
Reargument is designed to afford a party an opportunity to establish that the court overlooked or
misapprehended the relevant facts or misapplied a controlling principle of law (Foley v Roche, 68 AD2d 558,
418 NYS2d 588, 593 I1x Dept 1979]). A motion for reargument is not to be employed by the unsuccessful
party to argue once again the very questions previously decided (Foley v Roche, ~tpra; Flynn v Town of
North Hempstead, 114 Misc2d 125,451 NYS2d 352 [Sup Ct, Nassau Co 1982], afl'd97 AD2d 430, 467
NYS2d 395 [2d Dept 1983]).
Petitioners' submission fails to establish that the court overlooked facts or misapplied law; rather, it
demonstrates that petitioners disagree with the court's choice of case law or the rationale of the decision.
With respect to the "dicta" concerning an effective waiver, the determination in a related declaratory
judgment action (Index No. 97-24900) puts to rest any supposed issue of a waiver.
Dated:
it ha~ I~en t~ndin.g.
Index No 96-26389
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF N5~ YORK
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK
In the Matter of the Application of CROSS SOUND FERRY SERVICES, INC. and
ADAM C. WRONOWSKI, individually and as Custodian for JESSICA WRONOWSKI under the
Connecticut UGMA,
Petitioners,
for a Judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules
- against -
PLANNING BOARD OF THE TOWN OF SOUTHOLD, Respondent,
and
SOUTHOLD CITIZENS FOR SAFE ROADS, INC., Respondent-Intervenor.
ORDER
SMITH, FINKELSTEIN, LUNDBERG, ISLER and YAKABOSKI, LLP
~tomeys for Respondent
Office and Post Office Address
456 Gfiffing Avenue, P O. Box 389
RIVERHEAD, NEW YORK 11901-0203
Tel. 516-727-4100
Fax: 516.727-4130
E-MAIL sfli¥@peconic.net
Service of a copy of the within is hereby admitted.
Dated,
Attorney(s) for
Sir:--Please take notice
That the within is a qt, exc~i~ true copy of an Or der
duly entered in the office of a clerk of the within named court on December 6
that an order of which the within is a true copy will be presented for settlement to the HON.
at
on the
Dated,
one of the judges of the within named Court,
day of 19 at M.
19 99
Yours, etc.
SMITH, FINKELSTEIN, LUNDBERG, ISLER and YAKABOSKI, LLP
Attorneys for Respondent
To Esseks, Hefter &
Attorney(s) for Petitioners
Angel
Office and Post Office Address
456 Gnffing Avenue, P O. Box 389
RiVERHEAD, NEW YORK 11901-0203
Tel. 516-727-4100
Fax: 516-727-4130
E-MAIL sfliy@Iyeconic.net
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK
In the Matter of the Application of
SOUTHOLD CITIZENS FOR SAFE ROADS,
INC. and NORTH FORK ENVIRONMENTAL
COUNCIL, INC.
Petitioners,
for Judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil
Practice Law and Rules
PLANNING BOARD OF THE TOWN OF
SOUTHOLD and CROSS SOUND FERRY
SERVICES, INC.,
Respondents.
Index No.
02-01527
Assigned Justice:
Hon. John J. Dunn
VERIFIED REPLY
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT, the Respondent, The Planning Board of the Town of
Southold, by and through it's attorneys, Smith, Finkelstein, Lundberg, Islet and Yakaboski, as
and for it's Verified Answer for the Petition alleges:
1. As to paragraph numbered 1 of the Petition entitled "Nature of the Proceeding"
which consists of seven and one-half pages of non-enumerated allegations, the Planning Board
denies all allegations contained therein and respectfully avers that this paragraph does not
comport with the provisions of CPLR §3014.
2. Respondent denies knowledge of information sufficient to form a believe as to the
allegations set forth in paragraphs numbered 3 and 4 of the Petition.
3. Respondent, Planning Board, denies each and every allegation set forth in
paragraph numbered 5 except states that Cross Sound Ferry and it's predecessors have operated
ferries between New London, CT and it's ferry terminal at State Route 25, Orient Point,
Southold, NY since prior to 1900.
4. Respondent, Planning Board, denies the allegations set forth in paragraph
numbered 6 of the Petition except does admit that the ferry terminal is near a County Park and
the Orient State Park.
5. Respondent, Planning Board, denies the allegations set forth in paragraph
numbered 7 of the Petition and respectfully refers the Court to the record as to the issues of
ownership or control.
6. Respondent, Planning Board, as to paragraphs numbered 13, 14,15, 16, 114, 116,
117, 118, 119, 123, 155, and 157 of the Petition respectfully requests that the Court take judicial
notice of the provisions of the Zoning Code of the Town of Southold for the actual language and
meaning of the provisions set forth therein.
7. Paragraphs numbered 17, 18, 19, 21, 30, 31, 37, 38, 39 and 43 of the Petition
purport to allude to an affidavit of former Planning Board member and other unidentified
affiants. Respondent respectfully refers the Court to the actual documents, although not
submitted with the Petition, and, further, respectfully refers the Court to it's Order of December
6, 1999 which determined that neither the Planning Board nor any of its individual members had
the authority to render determinations concerning changes in use or intensity of use as those
terms are used in the provisions of §100-250 of the Southold Town Zoning Code.
2
8. Respondent, Planning Board, denies each and every allegation set forth in
paragraph numbered 22 of the Petition except admits the Planning Board approved Cross Sound
Ferry's application for additional parking in June 1995.
9. Respondent, Planning Board, denies each and every allegation set forth in
paragraph numbered 23 of the Petition except admits that at the time it approved additional
parking space, it was not aware that Cross Sound Ferry intended to introduce a passenger only
ferry.
10. Respondent, Planning Board, denies each and every allegation set forth in
paragraph numbered 24 of the Petition except admits that subsequent to receiving site plan
approval for additional parking space, Cross Sound Ferry did announce the introduction of a
passenger only ferry service.
11. Respondent, Planning Board, denies knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the allegations set forth in paragraphs numbered 25 and 26 of the Petition.
12. Respondent, Planning Board, denies each and every allegation set forth in
paragraph numbered 27 of the Petition
13. That with respect to paragraphs numbered 28, 29, 32, 33 and 34 of the Petition,
Respondent, Planning Board of the Town of Southold, admits that meetings were held and
determinations made but, again, respectfully refers this Court to it's Order of December 6, 1999
rendering such meetings and determinations invalid.
14. That with respect to paragraphs numbered 35, 36, 40, 41 and 42, the Planning
Board, respectfully refers the Court to the actual pleadings set forth in the referenced action but
also refers the Court to it's Order of December 6, 1999 and it's determination concerning the
Planning Boards lack of authority to maintain such an action.
3
15. That with respect to paragraph numbered 44 of the Petition, the Respondent,
Planning Board, respectfully refers the Court to the actual document for the verbiage contained
therein and for it's import in light of the Court's Order of December 6, 1999.
16. Respondent, Planning Board, denies each and every allegation set forth in
paragraphs numbered 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64,
65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90,
91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 103 and 128 and respectfully requests that the Court take notice of all prior
actions and proceedings heretofore had in this matter and, further, respectfully avers that these
allegations are irrelevant inasmuch as they pertain to a prior application before the Planning
Board which was never completed or acted upon by the Planning Board and, further, respectfully
refers the Court to it's Order of December 6, 1999.
17. That, Respondent, Planning Board, denies each and every allegation set forth in
paragraph numbered 96 except admits that in September of 2000, Cross Sound Ferry did submit
a revised site plan application.
18. That with respect tu paragraphs numbered 97, 98,99, 100, 101,102, 104, 105 and
106 the Respondent, Planning Board, respectfully refers the Court to all prior actions and
proceedings heretofore had herein, to the Return of the Planning Board, and further refers all
matters of law and statutory interpretation to the Court.
19. Respondent, Planning Board, denies each and every allegation set forth in
paragraph numbered 107 of the Petition except admits that Edward Forrester wrote a letter dated
August 14, 2000.
20. Respondent, Planning Board, denies the characterizations of the purported
documents and legal arguments made in paragraphs numbered 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115,
4
120, 121 and 122 of the Petition and respectfully refers the Court to the Return of the Planning
Board, and, further, respectfully refers all matters of law and statutory interpretation to the Court,
21. Paragraphs numbered 124, 125, 126 and 127 of the Petition purport to refer to an
appeal taken two years ago to the Zoning Board of Appeals. The Zoning Board is not a party to
this proceeding and assertions, of action or non-action, of the Zoning Board of Appeals are not
relevant to this proceeding.
22. Respondent, Planning Board, denies the allegations of paragraph numbered 129
and states that it based it's approval of the site plan upon all relevant factors pursuant to the
provisions of the Zoning Code of the Town of Southold.
23. Respondent, Planning Board, denies the allegations of paragraphs numbered 130,
131 and 132 of the Petition and respectfully refers the Court to the Return as well as to it's Order
of December 6, 1999 as it relates to the authority of the Planning Board in connection with the
issues of use and intensity of use in this situation.
24. Respondent, Planning Board, denies the allegations of paragraphs numbered 133
and 134 of the Petition except admits that the September 2000 site plan application was accepted.
25. Respondent, Planning Board, denies the allegations of paragraph numbered 135 of
the Petition except admits that it did circulate the September 2000 site plan application pursuant
to statute.
26.
Respondem, Planning Board, denies each and every allegation set forth in
paragraph numbered 136 of the Petition except it admits that it did classify Cross Sound Ferry's
then application as a Type I action.
27. Respondent, Planning Board of the Town of Southold, denies the allegations set
forth in paragraphs numbered 137, 138, 139, 140, 141,146, 147, 148 and 149 of the Petition and
respectfully refers the Court to the Return and refers all matters of law and statutory
interpretation to the Court for determination.
28. Respondent, Planning Board, denies each and every allegation set forth in
paragraph numbered 142 of the Petition except admits that SCSR sent a letter to the Planning
Board.
29. Respondent, Planning Board, denies each and every allegation set forth in
paragraph numbered 143 of the Petition except admits that a Negative Declaration was issued on
August 13, 2001.
30. Respondent, Planning Board, denies the allegation set forth in paragraph
numbered 144 of the Petition.
31. Respondent, Planning Board, denies the allegation of paragraphs numbered 145 of
the Petition and respectfully refers the Court to the Return and the Determination of the Board
dated December 10, 2001 and respectfully refers all matters of law and statutory interpretation to
the Court.
32.
Respondent, Planning Board, denies each and every allegation set forth in
paragraph numbered 150 of the Petition and respectfully refers the Court to the Return of the
Planning Board, it's December 10, 2001 Determination and, further, respectfully refers all
matters of law and statutory interpretation to the Court.
33. Respondent, Planning Board, denies each and every allegation set forth in
paragraph numbered 152 except admits that the proceeding referred to was commenced.
34. Respondent, Planning Board, denies each and every allegation set forth in
paragraph numbered 153 of the Petition except admits that on December 10, 2002 the site plan of
Cross Sound Ferry was approved.
6
35. Respondent, Planning Board of the Town of Southold, denies each and every
allegation set forth in paragraph numbered 154 and 156 of the Petition and respectfully refers all
matter of law and statutory interpretation to the Court.
36. Respondent, Planning Board, denies each and every allegation set forth in
paragraph numbered 158 of the Petition and respectfully refers the Court to the Return of the
Planning Board, the Determination and further refers all matters of law and statutory
interpretation to the Court.
37. Respondent, Planning Board of the Town of Southold, denies each and every
allegation set forth in paragraphs numbered 159, 160 and 161 of the Petition.
AS AND FOR A FIRST OBJECTION IN POINT OF LAW
38. That the Petition herein should be dismissed in that it fails to set forth a claim for
relief.
AS AND FOR A SECOND OBJECTION IN POINT OF LAW
39. Petitioners in their prayer for relief seek a Court order reversing or setting aside
any physical alteration of the Ferry site.
40. Petitioners in their response to Respondent, Planning Board, and Cross Sound
Ferry's Motion to Dismiss specifically declared that they had no objection to the site work
approved and directed by the Respondent, Planning Board, in it's December 10, 2001
Determination.
41. The site work and physical alterations have now been completed or are
substantially completed.
42. Based upon Petitioners statements in their response to Respondent's Motions to
Dismiss and based upon the fact of substantial completion of site improvements, Petitioners have
waived any claims to have the Court order modifications to the physical improvements already
7
completed and are further barred by the doctrines laches and mootness fi.om continuing to assert
any such claims as to the physical site work approved and directed by the Respondent, Planning
Board, in it's December 10, 2001 Resolution.
AS AND FOR A THIRD OB,IECTION IN POINT OF LAW
43. That the Petition inasmuch as it demands that the Planning Board of the Town of
Southold circumscribe lawful permitted uses of the ferry site owned and operated by Cross
Sound Ferry should be dismissed in that the Planning Board acting on those provisions of the
code which give it site plan authority has no authority to modify the code or restrict modify or
otherwise limit a legally permitted zoning use.
AS AND FOR A FOURTH OBJECTION IN POINT OF LAW
44. Petitioner having waived it's claims as regards the physical alterations of the site
authorized and required by the Planning Board's Decision of December 10, 2001 has no further
right to demand any further SEQRA inquiry as euncems Cross Sound Ferry's business decision
to implement or augment it's ferry service by the addition of a passenger only ferry to it's fleet of
vessels.
Dated: Riverhead, New York
October 10, 2002
By:
Yours, etc.,
,~~~ Sj. y~BSMITH, FINKELSTEIN, LUNDBERG, ISLER &
KI, LLP
OSKI, ESQ.
ttorney for'A~ondent
Planning Board of the Town of Southold
456 Gfiff'mg Avenue
P.O. Box 389
Riverhead, New York 11901
(631)727-4100
To:
JANET GEASA, ESQ.
Wickham, Wickham & Bressler, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioners
10315 Main Road
P.O. Box 1424
Mattituck, NY 11952
THOMAS G. RAFFERTY, ESQ.
Carvath, Swaine & Moore
Co-Attorneys for Petitioners
825 Eighth Ave.
New York, NY 10019
WILLIAM W. ESSEKS, ESQ.
Esseks, Hefter & Angel
Attorneys for Respondent
Cross Sound Ferry Services, Inc.
108 East Main Street
P.O. Box 279
Riverhead, NY 11901
9
STATE OF NEW YORK )
)ss.:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
Bennett Orlowski, Jr., being duly sworn, deposes and
says:
I am a Chairman of the Planning Board of the Town of
Southold. I have read the foregoing Reply of the Town of
Southold and know the contents thereof and that the same is
true to deponent's own knowledge, except as to those matters
therein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and
that as to those matters deponent believes them to be true.
Sworn to before me this
of , 2002.
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY FACSIMILE
STATE OF NEW YORK )
)SS.:
COUNTY oF SUFFOLK )
Jacquelyn C. Mack, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
I am not a party to this action and am over 18 years of age. I reside at 425 Sweezy
Avenue, Riverhead, NY 11901.
On October 11, 2002, I served the within VERIFIED REPLY upon the following
attorney(s) for the party or parties indicated, via facsimile to the facsimile designated by said
attorney(s) for that purpose:
TO:
Andrei Harasymiak, Esq.
Carvath, Swaine & Moore
Co-Attorneys for Petitioners
825 Eigth Ave.
New York, NY 10019
(212)474-3700
Sworn to before me this
~ day of October, 2002
Notary Public
TFansmission ~epoFt
This document WaS con+irmed.
(reduced sample and detai
Document SI ze getter--S
Is below)
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY FEDERAL EXPRESS
STATE OF NEW YORK)
)SS.:
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK)
I, Leslie Liss, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
I am not a party to this action and am over 18 years of age. I reside at 602 Pepperidge Lake
Rd. Eastport, NY 11941.
On October 11, 2002, I served one copy of the within VERIFIED REPLY upon the
following attorney(s) for the party or parties indicated at the address designated by said attorney(s)
for that purpose by depositing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a properly addressed Federal Express
envelope, in an official Federal Express depository under the exclusive care and custody of the
Federal Express Delivery service within the State of New York.
Name of Attorney(s) served
THOMAS G. RAFFERTY, ESQ.
Carvath, Swaine & Moore
Co-~tttorneys for Petitioners
825 Eighth Ave.
New York, NY 10019
Leslie Liss
Sworn to before me this
day of October, 2002.
N~,a~ Pub~ State d t#w York
No. 0;UC5086460. Suffolk Coumv
~(~I~X. USAAirbill ~..~. 8373 2127 3062
m 10/11/02 SW,c~r~E. 0:1. 17-4117-7
A~c~
.m. ~ ~- l~,~. ~(b~l )727-4100
m~SMITH FINKELSTEIN ETAL
~= 456 ~RIFFIN~ AVE
~R IV~RHEAD
11901-301~
,ur~~ ~
~1 ~ our ~
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY MAIL
STATE OF NEW YORK )
) SS:
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK )
Leslie Liss, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
I am not a party to this action and am over 18 years of age. I reside at 602 Pepperidge Lake Rd.,
Eastport, New York.
On October 11, 2002 1 served the within VERIFIED REPLY on the following attorney(s) for the
party or parties indicated, at the address designated by said attorney(s) for that purpose, by depositing a tree
copy thereof, enclosed in a postpaid properly addressed envelope, in an official depository under the
exclusive care and custody of the United States Postal Service within the State of New York:
TO:
JANET GEASA, ESQ.
Wickham, Wickham & Bressler, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioners
10315 Main Road
P.O. Box 1424
Mattimck, NY 11952
WILLIAM W. ESSEKS, ESQ.
Esseks, Hefter & Angel
Attorneys for Respondent
Cross Sound Ferry Services, Inc.
108 East Main Street
P.O. Box 279
Riverhead, NY 11901
LESLIE LISS
Subscribed and sworn to before me
this/,~r~ day of October 2002.
Notary Public
e46o. Suffolk C<:,cLnty /-
Index No 02-01527
SIdPP, JEME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK
In the Matter of the Application of
SOUTHOLD CITIZENS FOR SAFE ROADS, INC., and NORTH FORK ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL, INC.
Petitioners,
for Judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules
- against-
PLANNING BOARD OF THE TOWN OF SOUTHOLD and CROSS SOUND FERRY SERVICES, INC.
Respondents.
VERIFIED REPLY
SMITH, FINKELSTEIN, LUNDBERG, ISLER and YAKABOSKI, LLP
Attorneys for Respondents.
Office and Post Ofiqce Address
456 Grifih~g Avenue, I~ O. Box 389
RIVERHEAD, NEW YORK 11901-0203
Fol. 631-727-4100
Fax: 631-727-4130
E-MAIL sfliy(g'peconic,net
Service of a copy of the within
Dated,
is hereby admitted.
Attorney(s) for
Sir:--Please take notice
That the within is a (certified) true copy of a
duly entered in the office of a clerk of the within named court on
that an order of which the within is a true copy will be presented for settlement to the HON.
at
on the day of
Dated,
20
20
one of the judges of the within named Court,
at M.
Yours, etc.
SMITH, FINKELSTEIN, LUNDBERG, ISLER and YAKABOSKI, LLP
To
Attorney(s) for
Office and Post Office Address
456 GIiffing Avenue, 1~ O, Box 389
RIVERHEAD, NEW YORK 11901-0203
Tel. 631-727-4100
Fax: 631-727-4130
E-MAIL sfliy(Wpeconic.net
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION: SECOND DEPARTI~ENT
CROSS SOUND FERRY SERVICES, INC.,
Case Numbers: 98-05273 and
98-10689
Respondent,
NOTICE OF ENTRY
-against-
TOWN OF SOUTHOLD, et. al.,
Defendants,
SOL~rHOLD CITIZENS FOR SA-~E ROADS, INC.,
Proposed Intervenor-Appellant.
S I R S/M A D A M S:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the within are true copies of the Decisions and
Orders of the Appellate Division, Second Department, both dated July 26, 1999.
Dated: Riverhead, New York
August 5, 1999
By:
ES~~ANGEL
A~thon~6'C. Paeca, Esq.
Attorneys for Cross Sound Ferry Services,
108 East Main Street, P. O. Box 279
Riverhead, New York 11901
(516) 369-1700
TO:
Smith, Finkelstein, Islet, Lundberg & Yakaboski
Attorneys for Town of Southold
456 Griffing Avenue, P.O. Box 389
Riverhead, bP/ 11901
Thomas G. Rafferty, Esq.
CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE
Attorneys for Intervenor-Plaintiff
Worldwide Plaza
825 Eighth Avenue
New York, X~Y 10019-7475
Eric J. Bressler, Esq.
WICKI{A~, WICKHAM & BRESSLER, P.C.
Attorneys for Intervenor-Plaintiff
Main Road, P.O. Box 1424
Mattituck, RTY 11952
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPI~JJ~.TEDIVISION : SECOND JUDICIALDEPARTMF. NT
AD2d
SONDRA MILLER, J.P.
FRED T. SANTUCCI
ROBERT W. SCHMIDT
NANCY E. SMITH, JJ.
7278D
OOv
Submitted - May 20, 1999
98-05273
98-10689
Cross Sound Ferry Services, Inc., respondent,
v Town of Southold, et al., defendants;
Southold Citizens for Safe Roads, Inc.,
proposed intervenor-appellant.
DECISION & ORDER
Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York, N.Y. (Thomas G. Rafferty and Aviva
O. Wertheimer of counsel), and Wickham, Wickham & Bressler, P.C.,
Mattituck, N.Y. (Eric J. Bressler and Janet Geasa of counsel), for proposed
intervenor-appellant (one brief filed).
Esseks, Hefter & Angel, Riverhead, N.Y. (William W. Esseks and Anthony
C. Pasca of counsel), for respondent.
In an action, inter alia, for a judgment declar'mg that certain provisions of
the Town Code of the Town of Southold are unconstitutional, the proposed intervenor appeals
(1) from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Dunn, J.), dated May 5,
1998, as denied its motion for leave to intervene as a defendant, and (2) from an order of the
same court, dated September 30, 1998, which denied its motion, in effect, for reargument.
ORDERED that the appeal from the order da~cl September 30, 1998, is
dismissed, as no appeal lies from an order denying reargument; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order dated May 5, 1998, is affu-rned insofar as appealed
from; and it is further,
ORDERED that the respondent is awarded one bill of costs.
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the
appellaht's motion for leave to intervene because the appellant's submissions in support of its
motion failed to establish that its members possessed a real and substantial interest in the
outcome of this action (see, CPLR 1013; cf., Town of Southold v Cross Sound Ferry
Servs., __ AD2d [2d Dept., Dec. 14, 1998]; Patterson Materials Corp. v Town
of Pawling, 221 AD2d 609; Matter of Clinton v Summers, 144 AD2d 145).
July 26, 1999 Page 1.
CROSS SOUND FERRY SERVICES, INC. v TOWN OF SOUTHOLD
The denial of the appellant's motion, characterized as one for renewal and
reargument, is not appealable because it was not based upon new facts which were unavailable
at the thne it submitted its original motion for leave to intervene, and it is therefore actually a
motion to reargue (see, White Rose Food v Mustafa, 251 AD2d 653).
The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit.
S. MILLER. J.P., SANTUCCI, SCHMIDT, and SMITH, JJ., concur.
98-05273
98-10689
Cross Sound Ferry Services, Inc., respondent,
v Town of Southold, et al., defendants;
Southold Citizens for Safe Roads, Inc.,
proposed intervenor-appellant.
DECISION & ORDER ON MOTION
Cross motion by the respondent on appeals from two orders of the Supreme
Court, Suffolk County, dated May 5, 1998, and September 30, 1998, respectively, inter
alia, to dismiss the appeal from the order dated September 30, 1998, on the ground, inter
alia, that no appeal lies from an order denying reargument, and to strike the appellant's record
and brief, or to strike portions of the appellant's record and brief on the ground that they
contain or refer to matter dehors the record. By decision and order on motion of this court
dated February 3, 1999, those branches of the cross motion which were to dismiss the appeal
from the order dated September 30, 1998, and to strike the record and brief of the appellant, or
to strike portions of the record and brief, were held in abeyance and referred to the Justices
hearing the appeal for determination upon the argument or submission of the appeal.
Upon the papers filed in support of the cross motion, the papers filed in
opposition thereto, and upon the submission of the appeals, it is
ORDERED that the branch of the cross motion which is to dismiss the appeal
from the order dated September 30, 1998, is denied as academic in light of the determination
on appeal (see, Cross Sound Ferry Servs. v Town of Southold,_ AD2d__
[decided herewith]); and it is further,
ORDERED that the branch of the cross motion which is to strike portions of
the appellant's record and brief is granted to the extent that pages 269 through 302 of the
record on appeal, and any references thereto contained in the brief, are stricken and have not
been considered in the determination of the appeal; and it is further,
ORDERED that the cross motion is otherwise denied.
S. MILLER, J.P., SANTUCCI, SCItMIDT, and SMITH, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Martin H. Brownstein
Clerk
July 26, 1999
CROSS SOUND FERRY SERVICES, INC. v TOWN OF SOUTHOLD
Page 2.
ESSeK$, HEFTER & ANGEL
Io~ EAST MAIN STREET
F~IVERHEAD, N.Y. I 1901-0279
February29,2000
DELIVERED BY HAND
Mr. Bennett Orlowski, Jr., Chairman
Town of Southold Planning Board
Southold Town Hall
53095 Main Road
P.O. Box 1179
Southold, NY 11971
Re: Cross Sound Ferry Services, Inc.; Submission of
Additional Material to Pending Site Plan Ai)plication
Dear Mr. Orlowski:
Cross Sound Ferry Services, Inc. hereby submits additional information as
requested to supplement the currently pending application for Site Plan Approval for their
Orient Point facility. This submission consists of two parts - - (1) the updated illustration of
the "Maximum Assisted Parking Plan", which demonstrates how the owner operates during
peak periods of parking, and (2) a "pro forma" site plan which demonstrates conformity with
asserted requirements on the assumption that Cross Sound was now beginning operations for
the first time (i.e., did not have claimed vested rights). The "pro forma" site plan is submitted
at the direction of the Planning Board and Cross Sound Ferry Services, Inc. does not seek its
approval. This submission is made in accordance with the parties' many discussions for the
purpose of settling on-going litigation and should be reviewed in that context.
Without prejudice to Cross Sound's position that no approval is necessary or
required for it to continue its operations in a manner that the site has been historically
operated and as represented on the "Maximum Assisted Parking Plan ", Cross Sound Ferry
Services, inc. hereby requests the Planning Board to approve the application, pursuant to
Town Code § 100-191 A, in accordance with said "Maximum Assisted Parking Plan '. While,
pursuant to §100-191A, the Planning Board appears to claim authority to set "reasonable and
ESSEKS, HeFTeR ~ A~NGEL
COUNSELORS AT LAW
February 29, 2000
Page 2
appropriate off street parking requirements for ... uses which do not fall within the categories
listed below..." (there is no parking specification for a "ferry") we submit that the historic use
of this site for ferry parking purposes is a use, non-conforming or otherwise, that certainly has
existed and continues to exist prior to the exercise of any claimed authority to fix "appropriate
off street parking requirements" for this parcel. Nevertheless, and pursuant to § 100-191A,
please fix the parking for the Snack Bar Parcel and the West Parcel in accordance with the
"Max/mum Assisted Parking Plan."
If Cross Sound's requests are approved, Cross Sound represents that it will not
implement parking on the parcels reflected in the accompanying submission that exceed the
levels shown on the Assisted Parking Plan, without first obtaining approval from the Planning
Board.
In the event that the Board believes that some existing Town Code off street
parking criteria are applicable to this ferry parking use then, Cross Sound, on the same basis
as above, asks the Planning Board, as an alternative, to grant dimensional waivers from the
following provisions of the Code:
Section 100-191 C; Parking Space Size and Aisle Width;
Section 100-19 t D; Parking Access
for both the Snack Bar and West parking lots.
As requested by the Planning Board, this submission, supplementing the
currently pending application, includes the following:
9 copies of the "Maximurn Assisted Parking Plan" prepared by John J.
Raynor, P.E., L.S., P.C. dated 2/25/00 for the Cross Sound Ferry
Services, Inc.
9 copies of "pro forma" Site Plan set prepared by John J. Raynor, P.E.,
L.S, P.C. revised as of 2/25/00 for the Cross Sound Ferry Services, Inc.
9 copies of a narrative entitled 'Mssisted Parking Procedures" prepared
by Cross Sound Ferry Services, Inc., dated 2/29/00, which describes the
Ess£Ks, HEFTer & ANgeL
COUNSELORS AT LAW
February 29, 2000
Page 3
manner in which assisted parking is used as part of Cross Sound Ferry's
operation.
9 copies of Key Map showing adjacent parcels within 500' of the subject
parcel.
This submission is without prejudice to applicants' continued assertion that
Article XXV (particularly § 100-250) of the Town Code is not applicable to applicant's use of
the subject premises by the terms of the Code and by reason of Cross Sound's character as a
Federally-chartered carrier meeting public demand for interstate commerce, and if said Article
were applicable, it is unconstitutional generally, and as applied to applicant's said use.
We look forward to working with the Town Planning Board and its staff in an
attempt to resolve outstanding issues existing between the applicant and the Town.
I trust that if you have any questions or require additional information, you will
not hesitate to contact me.
Very truly yours,
!~I~C__ ~. C~'''[q
William W. Esseks
/mi
Enclosures
cc/encs.: Francis Yakaboski, Esq. (Delivered by Hand) d/
Adam Wronowski, Cross Sound Ferry Services, Inc.
Eugene Gulland, Esq.
Richard E Warren, Inter-Science Research Associates
t ~y~ #~
Assisted Parking Procedures at Orient Point Terminal
As discussed in meetings with Town representatives, in order to meet the demand
for ks service from the traveling public using the Orient Point t~ u,;na~ Cross Sound F~ y
optimizes the parking og vehicles on ~ts two terminal pnrking lot ~cilifies using a
technique ~alled As~/~ted P~'king. A~sisted Park/rig uses parklnS lot ~giaats employed
by Cross Sound Ferry W direct and assist passenge~ who leave their vehicles a~ the
terminal when using the service,
Passengers begin arriving at the terminal up to one hour betbre the first departure
time at 7:00 am, seven days a week. The w~t parklno~ parcel is closed offto save spaces
for long term parking (those net coming back the same day), employee parking, and
overflow parking. Passengers are directed by signs to enter the snack bar parking parcel at
the ent-ranc-- south of the snack bar nearest the vessel slips. When the sou~ern end of the
parkin8 lot has available space, all passengers will enter the parking lot at this southern
entrance. An atte~lant at the entrance d/rects each vehicle to one or two other arumdan~s
who then thrther imtmct the passenger where to park in relation ~o the other vehictes in the
lot. Cross Sound Ferry tuts found that by doing this, ii has been ~ble to maximize its
parking facilities to satis~ customer demand and minimize the occasions on which
passengers leave their vehicles on th-. shoulders of Route 25 or on other public or private
areas o~side the terminal.
By: #;
Once the southern end of'the parlcin$ lot is filled, tha~ entrance is closed ofl~ the
northe~-n entrance is opened, and the attendants then move to -che northern end of the lot 'co
begin directing vehicles to parking places. Once the nor~rn end of the paztdng lot
filled and the ~nth-e snack bar lot is fully occupied for pm'king p~poses, the
then move over to the west parking parcel. An a~tendaat is placed at the ~ of the
Cross Sound Ferry driveway ju~ before the entra~c~ to ~ west parki~ lot. Each
passenger is asked wh~ther he or she is taking the whicle onto the fi~ry or parking k in thc
lot. [t'the passenger is parking the vehicle, he or she is th~ dirked ~ the west lot and
to one or two other axt~danc~ who then furthar insWa~t tl~ pass.get as to parking
proximity to other vehicles. In the west parking lot. passengers are first dirked to park in
the northern mos~ so,on of thc lot olosest to Route 25. Asthe lot begins to fill,
attendants move in a southerly direction t~wards the ves~l slil~ utilizing the exterior
parking stalls on thc w~c and ~ast sides of the lot. Once all pazking stalls are filled, if
demand warrants, a center lane ia formed with vehicles parking in a single file r~w
perpendicular to the vehicles parked in the outside rows. At all times, there are tw~ open
lanes wide enough to ~,~ble vehicles parked on both the east and w~ sides of rig lot
exit upon the passengers' re,urn. This holds true for the mack bar lot also. Al1 lanes are
wide enough to a21ow passengers room to exit the lot upon th~h' return. This Ls an
important feature, because passengers are not required to commit to & sp~Lfi~ r~wn time.
if a passenger decides to return on ~ la-cer than planned trip, he or she is ensured not to be
blocked in by ~nother vehicle.
2
While attendants are used to ensure optimum utilization of both the snack bar
parking lot a~d the west parking lot in order to meet customer demand and avoid overflow
omo Route 25 and elsewhere, axtendants do not individually direct passengers out of their
respective parking spots upon their retum~ This is due to thc fa~t that the assistance
provided by the attendants, ~t ~he time that the passengers park, stows the lXUlx~e of
structuring the overall parking arrangement in the most efficient manner. The assistance
ensures that the passengers' vehicle.~ are not "j~mmed' into a park~g arrangement, and
that it allows for a~ immediate and orderly departure. Parking attendams do not
physically operate the vehicle or park the vehicle for the passenger~, but direct the
passenger to maneuver his or her own vehicle into a parking ~ee. Pazzengers axe not
required to perform any out of the ordinary or advanced driving methods when entering,
parking, or exiting. The ~endants are able to cot~figure the vehicles in a parking
arransement that prevents any vehicles from being blocked by other vehicles. This
particular arrangement, obtained thmngh ,he teelmique termed Assisted Parking, allows
passengers to be able to leave their parking spot, regardless of'heir return time.
While the Azsisted Parking Procedure is in place, Cross Sound Ferry maintains
staff on duty durin~ the period that pa~,ngers return to Orient Point. Ifa passenger
encounters an out of the ordiaa~ di~eulty when attempting to leave the parking facility.
(i.e. dead battery, fiat tire, blocked in by unauthorized vehicle) an ~ttendent is on duty at
the Orient Point ticket terminal to assist the passe.ri'.
3
Sent By: #; 8604403492; Fe~-2g-o0 12:06~ Page 5/5
Cross Sound Ferry has found that ~e Assisted Parking procedure ia place at its
Orient Point Terminal Facility bas allowed for opfmum utilizaLion oftl~ parking available
al: the terminal to serve the demand for Cro~ Sound's service. Throu~ this procedure,
Cross Soumi Ferry has found that it is able to ~'k 235 velxicles in the Saadc Bar Park~
Lot and up to ][58 vehicles in the West Parking Lot. This m.~miTsti~a ofpaddn~
facilities has enabler Cross Sound Ferry, to tlm lest of its ability, to accommod-_t- the
demand for its water, borne traasponatkm service, wbLle mlnimiziag tl~ potential of spill-
over parking ohm off-terminal locations.
4