HomeMy WebLinkAboutPublic Utility Agency 1998GREGORY F. YAKABOSKI
TOV~N ATTORNEY
JEAN W. COCHRAN
Supervisor
Town Hall, 53095 Main Road
P.O. Box 1179
Southold, New York 11971
Telephone (516) 765-1889
Fax (516) 765-1823
OFFICE OF THE TOWN ATTORNEY
TOWN OF SOUTHOLD
MEMORANDUM
ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONDFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
TO: SUPERVISOR JEAN W. COCHRAN;
TOWN BOARD MEMBERS
FROM: GREGORY F. YAKABOSKI, ESQ., TOWN ATTORNE~/"~ '~-Tr;
DATE: JUNE 24, 1999
SUBJECT: ELECTRICITY
At Tuesday's board meeting Jack William's raised a question about electricity
and the status of the Town's research on this topic.
In short, neither the Town of Southold nor any Long Island Town or Village can
"wheel in" and distribute inexpensive electricity~ unless LIPA consents. Whether or not
the Town forms a municipal electric agency does not change this fact.
The Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) owns and controls all of the Electric
Transmission and Distribution ("Electric Lines") in Nassau and Suffolk County2
There are sources of inexpensive electrical power throughout the United States.
Except for the 3 villages of Greenport, Freeport and Rockville Center.
It is not possible to transmit and distribute electrical power in Nassau and Suffolk
County without using LIPA's Electric Lines
There are only two (2) ways to use LIPA's Electric Lines:
1) By Force; or
2) With LIPA's consent.
1992 ENERGY POLICY ACT
By Force: A common misperception is that the 1992 Energy Policy Act
grants any entity the ability to force large existing electric companies to let them "wheel
in" and distribute cheap electric over electric company lines. This is not true unless
certain conditions are meet. The criteria for any Long Island Town or Village municipal
electric agency to force LIPA to let it "wheel in" and distribute inexpensive electric
power over LIPA's lines is found in section 212(h) of the Federal Power Act
(h)
PROHIBITION ON MANDATORY RETAIL WHEELING AND SHAM
WHOLESALE TRANSACTIONS--No order issued under this Act shall
be conditioned upon or require the transmission of electric energy:
(1) directly to an ultimate consumer, or
(2) to, or for the benefit of, an entity if such electric energy would
be sold by such entity directly to an ultimate consumer, unless:
(A) such entity is a Federal power marketing agency; the
Tennessee Valley Authority; a State or any political
subdivision ora State (or an agency, authority, or
instrumentality of a State or political
subdivision).., and
(B) such entity was providing electric service to such
ultimate consumer on the date of enactment of this
subsection (October 24, 1992) or would utilize
transmission or distribution facilities that it owns or
controls to deliver all such electric energy to such
electric consumer.
Nothing in this subsection shall affect any authority of
any State or local government under State law
concerning the transmission of electric energy directly
to an ultimate consumer.
16 U.S.C. section 824k (h) 1994 (emphasis added)
Southold cannot meet the criteria contained in 2 (B). Southold did not provide
electric service prior to October 24, 1992. Southold does not own or control
transmission or distribution facilities. 3
LIPA'S CONSENT
LIPA's Consent: I do not believe LIPA will consent to any Town or Village
wheeling in and distributing inexpensive electric power.
3 To qualify Southold could build a duplicate T&D system. (I realize that this is not a
cost effective solution.) Based on the Attorney Generals Opinion to Robert Cimino
neither Southold or any other Town or Village on Long Island had the right or power to
condemn LILCO Electric Lines on Long Island once the LIPA statute became effective
(1987)
"It is also clear that a local government may not condemn the assets of LILCO or
LIPA under Article 14-A of the General Municipal Law. Article 14-A provides
general authority to establish municipal utilities. The exercise of such general
authority by a municipality dearly is inconsistent with the specific statutory
scheme applicable to the LILCO service area, providing the exclusive means of
dealing with economic conditions in the service area through the purchase of
LILCO by LIPA and subsequent provisions of power in the service area by
LIPA. Under established rules of statutory construction, specific statutes prevail
over general statutes. See. People v. Mobil Oil Corp., 48 NY2d 192, 200 (1979).
Article 14-A may not be used for this purpose." Attorney General' s Informal
Opinion No. 98-13, dated March 30, 1998 in response to an inquiry from Robert
Cimino, Esq. Suffolk County Attorney.
ATTORNEY GENERAL & STATE COMPTROLLER OPINION'S
The Town has not yet received responses to its requests for opinions from either
the Attorney General or the State Comptroller. However, neither of those opinions will
change the fact that the 1992 Energy Policy Act would not permit a Long Island Town or
Village municipal electric age ncy to force LIPA to allow them to "wheel in" and
distribute inexpensive electric over its electric lines unless the above stated criteria were
satisfied.
The Attorney General Opinion and the State Comptroller Opinion only address
the formation ora public utility agency by the Town of Southold. At the Town Board
meeting Jack William's question focused on the formation of a public utility agency
(electric company). A public utility agency would only be the tool to manage the
purchase, wheeling and distribution electric power. A Town Municipal electric agency
could purchase electric power but it would have no means of transporting and distributing
it on Long Island or, more specifically, in the Town of Southold.
The research on this issue has consumed a tremendous amount of time. In light of
these facts please advise if my department should continue with any additional research
on this issue.
This opinion is based on:
-The FERC opinion letter and the cited FERC decisions. (City of Palm Springs,
California; Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, et. al: Suffolk County Electric
Agency)
-Conversations with:
FERC's legal counsel
(3) three attorney's who specialize in this field.
the NY.S Public Service Commission
LIPA representatives
legal counsel for the Suffolk County Electric Agency
the Attorney General's Office
the State Comptroller's Office
Attorney General's Opinion to Robert Cimino
Congressman's Forbes Office
N Y. S Office of Consumer Protection
Gordian Raccke of the Citizens Advisory Panel- Long Island's Energy
Watchdog Group
Jack Kulka (now a member of the Suffolk County Electric Agency Board)
- General Municipal Law Article 14-A
- Review of the Power Alternatives Report
Review of the SEQRA rules and regulations
- Review of the LIPA Statute
- Consultations with an Environmental Consultant (Chick Voorhis)
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, [3. C. 20426
May 7, 1999
Ms. Jean W. Cochran
Supervisor
Town of Southold
53095 Main Road
Southold, NY 11971
Dear Ms. Cochran:
Thank you for your March 16, 1999,
plans of the Town of Southold (Southold)
utility.
letter regarding the
to establish a public
The Energy Policy Act, among other things, expanded the
Commission's authority under section 211 of the Federal Power Act
(FPA) to require transmitting utilities to provide transmission
to municlpal customers under certain circumstances. In several
cases (copies of which are enclosed), the Commission has
addressed whether and to what extent a municipal customer may be
the beneficiary of such an order. See, e.g., city of Palm
SDrin~s. California, 76 FERC ~ 61,127 (1996), order on reh'~, 84
FERC ~ 61,225 (1998); Cleveland Electric Illuminatinq Company,et
al., 76 FERC ~ 61,115 (1996), order on reh'~, 82 FERC ~ 61,254
(1998); Suffolk County Electrical A~encv, 77 FERC ~ 61,355
(1996).
In Palm SDrin~s, for example, the City requested an order
from the Commission under section 211, directing the Southern
California Edison Company (Edison) to provide transmission
service. The Commission denied the City's application. It did
so based, in part, on its finding that while the City had
proposed to install physical facilities (i.e., duplicate meters
to serve customers then served by Edison), these limited
facilities, by themselves, do not deliver power. The Commission,
therefore, held that these facilities did not constitute
"transmission or distribution facilities," as required by section
212(h)(2)(B) of the FPA. This statutory provision, the
Commission noted, prohibits the commission from ordering direct
retail wheeling. It requires that a section 211 applicant
demonstrate, among other things, that it "would utilize
transmission or distribution facilities that it owns or controls"
to deliver electric energy to the customers it seeks to serve
pursuant to its transmission request.
Whether Southcld would be eligible to request an order under
section 211 of the FPA, however, would turn on the s~ecific facts
presented. In making such a determination, moreover, it may be
necessary to consider state and local laws and any contracts to
which Southold may be a party. Under these circumstances, it may
be appropriate for Southold first to consult legal counsel before
considering any further course of action Southold may wish to
take.
Should you require further g~idance from the Commission on
this matter, several options are available. First, under the
Commission's rules, 18 C.F.R. S 388.104 (1998), a request for a
legal interpretation of any statute or implementing regulation
under the jurisdiction of the Commission may be directed to the
Commission's Office of General Counsel (accompanied by the
prescribed fee). Alternatively, any person seeking "iai
declaratory order or rule to terminate a controversy or remove
uncertainty" may file a petition with the Commission pursuant to
Rule 207 of the commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18
C.F.R. S 385.207 (1998). A request for a declaratory order is
also subject to a filing fee. Requests for a legal
interpretation and requests for a declaratory order should be
accompanied by a detailed recitation of all facts relevant to the
issues presented. Additionally, a municipal customer may be able
to file a application under section 211 of the FPA. This
application likewise should be accompanied by detailed recitation
of all facts relevant to the issues presented.
I hope this information is helpful. If I may be of any
further assistance to you regarding this or any other Commission
matter, please let me know.
Sincerely,
Director
Office of External Affairs
Enclosures
JEAN W, COCHRAN
SUPERVISOR
Town Hall, 53095 Main Road
P.O. Box 1179
Southold, NewYork 11971
Fax (516) 765-1823
Telephone (516) 765-1889
OFFICE OF THE SUPERVISOR
TOWN OF SOUTHOLD
Via U.S. Mail
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
888 First Street, NE
Washington. D.C. 20426
Dear Sir/Madam:
March 16, 1999
Thc Town of Southold desires to form a "public utility service" pursuant to Article 14-A of the
General Municipal Law. which article is entitled "Gas and Electric Service". The Town's plan is to:
"form this public utility seorice, purchase low cost power (electric) wholesale on the open market
and distribute this power to the residential and commemial users in the Town of Southold. The town
public utility service would have no utility infrastructure, such as transmission and distribution lines.
Instead. the town utility agency would act as a "pass through" or in the capacity of an energy broker".
In 1992 the Energy Policy Act was enacted which "deregulated" the electric and gas industries.
Please advise as to whether the Town of Southold's plan, as set forth above, is permitted under thc
Energy Policy Act.
Please feel free to call with any questions.
Vc~ truly yours,
chran. Supervisor
Town of Southold
JWC:ck
Commission Opinions, Orders and Notices
61,595
(F) A presiding administrative law judge, to
be designated by the Chief Administrative Law
Judge for that purpose pursuant to 18 C.F.R.
§ 375.304, shall c~nvene a prehearlng confer-
ence in this proceeding to be held within 20
days of the issuance of this order, in a hearing
or conference room of the Federal Energy Reg-
Appendix A
Part I: Accepted & Suspended to be Effective
January 1, 1997
To FERC Gas T~££, Second Revised Volume
No. I-A
First Revised Sheet Nos. 21 fred 2lA
Part III: Rejected
To FERC Gas TarffL Second Revised Volume
No. I-A
Alternate First Revised Third Revised Sheet
No. 10
To FERC Gas Tat'ill, Second Revisc~ Volume
No. I-A
First Revised Third Revised Sheet No. 10
Part II: Accepted to be Effective August 1,
1996 * Also filed a protest.
[¶61,1151
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Docket No. ELg6-g-000
Cleveland Public Power of the City of Cleveland, Ohio v. Cleveland Electric
Illuminating Company, Docket No. ELd6-21-000
Order Denying Petition for Declaratory Order and Granting Complaint
(Issued July 31, 1996)
Before Commissioners: Elizabeth Anne Moler, Chair; Vicky A. Bailey, James J.
Hoecker, William L. Massey, and Donald F. Santa, Jr.
1. Introduction
These cases, a petition for declaratory order
and a complaint, involve the same transaction.
Cleveland Public Power of the City of Cleve-
land, Ohio (Clevelatld) ~eeks transmission ser-
vice under an existing transmission agreement
with Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company
(Cleveland Electric). Cleveland plans to use
the transmission to purchase power from a
third party. It will tl~n combine the purchased
power with its oti~r resources so that, begin-
ning September 1, 1996, it can serve an ex-
isting (i.e., through August 31, 1996) r~tail
customer of Cleveland Electric. Cleveland
Electric opposes the request. Each party asks
us to decide the dispute.
For the reasons discussed below, we agree
with Cleveland that Cleveland Electric is obli-
Appendix 1~
Natural G~s Clearinghouse
Public Service Commission of Nevada
Sierra Pacific Powe?.~Com~an~*
Southwest Gas~dr~ration
FERC Reports
gated under an existing agreement to provide
the requested transmission service. We further
conclude that the requested transmission ~'r-
vice does not violate section 212(h) of thc Fed
eral Power Act (FPA). Therefore. wc will dcny
marily decide thc complaint in rawer (, Ck'.'~
land. Finally, we dismiss Clevchmd l~kcnic'~
prejudice to refiling and demonstralin~ ~h;n i~
meets the criteria for seeking recovery under
our recent Open Access Rule.
II, Background
Cleveland, a municipal utility, is dependent
on Cleveland Electric for transmission service
to reach alternate suppliers. Cleveland and
Cleveland Electric have engaged in door-to-
¶61,115
61,596 Cited as "76 FERC ¶ .... " ?Zl 8-~-96
early 1900's, and the instant controversy arises
out of a retail customer's desire to change
power suppliers. The Medical Center Company
(Medical Center) has been served at retail by
Cleveland Electric for approximately 60 years.
Recently, however, Medical Center decided to
Electric (i.e., aa of September 1. 1996).
On March 1, 1995, Cleveland and Medical
Ag~ement (Cleveland/Medical Center Agree-
ment), Medical Center will purchase up to 50
MW of power and energy from Cleveland for a
period of five years, commencing September 1,
1996. Cleveland will deliver the power and
energy to Medical Center over a 138 kV trans-
mission line owned by Cleveland.
On August 11, 1995, Cleveland sent a letter
to Cleveland Electric requesting transmission
service under the parties' existing agreement
¶61,115
hibited under sections 211 and 212 of the FPA.
16 U.S.C. § § 824j, k (1994).3
On December 13, 1995. in Docket No.
EL96-21-000, Cleveland filed a complaint, m~-
tion for summary disposition and motion for
expedited procedural schedule. Cleveland
states that Cleveland Electric already is obli-
gated to provide the requested transmission
service under the parties' existing transmission
service agreement4 and under certain antitrust
conditions in a Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion (NRC) license.5 Cleveland requests that
the Commission expedite the r~olution of this
matter so that the proposed power sale may
commence as scheduled (on September 1,
Federel Energy Guidelines
Commission Opinions, Orders ond Notices
61,597
On December 28. 1995, Cleveland Electric
filed an answer to Cleveland's pleading. On
January 11. 1996, Cleveland filed an answer in
power to [Clcvela~d]."w
1II. Discussion
A. Procedural Issues
§385.214 (1995), the timely, unopposed mc-
Docket Nos. EL96-9-000 and EL96-21-000
serve to make them parties to the respective
proceedings.
Edison and LILCO concede in their filings
that they have no direct interest in this case,
but wish to intervene because of the industry-
wide implications they see arising from a ruling
here. Clevel~a~,d argues that Edi~ ~ud LILCO
should not be allowed to intervene because the
Ohio Power/Cleveland transaction involves the
parties' local, case-specific circumstances and
w/Il not estnblish precedent for the entire in-
dustry. Ohio Power also opposes intervention,
on the grounds that exploring the generic im-
plications of this case would delay the start of
service to Medical Center. The controversy in
this proceeding involves not only case-slmcific
i~ues, but also the Commission's interpretation
of section 212(h). Accordingly. we £md it in the
public interest to grant the motions to inter-
vene of Edison and LILC0.
B. Cleveland Electr/c's Obi/gar[lin to Provide
the Transrnlss/on Service at Issue la This Pro-
1. We find that Cleveland Electric is obli-
gated to provide the requested transmission
service under Cleveland Electric's currently ef-
fective transmission service agreement? The
relevant sections of this agreement require
Cleveland Electric to provide for the transmis-
sion o! electric power.
[B}etween delivery (interconnection) points
o~ [Cleveland Electric] to, from, between, or
among rural electric ceoperative~ er munici-
palitie~ located within the Combined CAPCO
(Central Area Power Coordination Group)
Company Territories (CCCT) .... [
It further provides that:
[Clevelsnd Electricl shall provide Trans-
mission Service within the limits of the ca-
pacity of its bulk transmission facilities, and
related facilities .... to the extent that such
Transmission ~ervice does not impose a bur-
den upon the system of [Cleveland Elec-
tricl.{iai
The language o[ the parties' agreement thus
states that Cleveland Electric will transmit to
"municipalities located within ... CAPCO,"
which includes Cleveland, if Cleveland Electric
has sufficient transmission capacity and doing
so will not impose a burden on Cleveland Elec-
tric's transmission s~tfflll.14 Hel'~, there is Ilo
960 Fed. Reg. 65/29 (1995). In re~ to a
motion far extension of time filed by Cleveland Elec-
FERC Reports
¶61,115
61,598 Cited as
question that Cleveland Electric has the neces-
sar3, capacity, and the requested transmission
would impose no burden on its system. Cleve-
land Electric stated in its November 2 and 3.
1995 letters rejecting Cleveland's request that
lack of sy~tom capacity played no part in the
utility's refusal; Cleveland Electric stated,
'[p]lease be further advised that [Cleveland
Electric's] refusal to provide the requested
transmission services is not due to any limita-
tion on the [Cleveland Electric] transmission
system .... ..is In addition, Cleveland Electric
has not claimed in any of its pleadings that the
transmission at issue here would impose a bur-
den upon its system. Therefore, pursuant to the
terms of the transmission service agreement,
Cleveland Electric must provide the transmis-
sion service necessary to implement the Ohio
Power/Cleveland Agreement.
2. We next address Cleveland Electric's argu-
ments that we may not require it to provide
the requested transmission service because that
would violate sections 212(h) of the FPA, 16
U.S.C. § 824k(h) (1994). Cleveland Electric ar-
gues that while, on paper, Ohio Power will
make a wholesale sale to Cleveland, which, in
turn, will serve Medical Center at retail, the
reality belies that description. In support,
Cleveland Electric argues that the price Cleve-
land will charge Medical Center is directly tied
to the costs of the power and energy Ohio
Power will supply to Cleveland. Cleveland
Electric also cites to the legislative history of
the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct), and
argues that the Ohio Power/Cleveland transac-
tion is precisely the kind of transaction that
section 212(h) prohibits? Finally, Cleveland
Electric argues that it should not be requir~
to provide the requested transmissioo under its
transmission service agreement since
'[i]mplicit in any transmission tariff intended
(Footnote Continued)
¶61,115
to provide for wholesale transmission is a legiti-
mate wholesale sale.''17
In response, Cleveland argues that sections
211 and 212 are irrelevant since the Commis-
sion "has authority to order a utility to comply
with its filed tariff ... totally independent of
any limitations upon its enhanced Energy Pol-
icy Act authority.''~s In support, Cleveland
cites an order in which the Commission held
that the utility was required by an existing
contract to provide transmission service to a
customer, stating that "no expansion of a mil-
ity's commitment to wheel is being ordered,
but rather a utility is being required to per-
form the service it voluntarily obligated itself
to porlorm by entering into the [contract].'~9
Cleveland also responds to Cleveland Elec-
tric's argument that the Ohio Power/Cleveland
Agreement is not a legitimate wholesale sale.
Cleveland states that the power it will
purchase from Ohio Power is not earmarked for
any particular retail customer, and that the
power it supplies to Medical Center will be
commingled with power from other sources.
Cleveland argues that the fact that the pricing
of Cleveland's retail sale to Medical Center is
tied to the pricing of Cleveland's purchase from
Ohio Power does not transform the requested
transmission for power under the Ohio Power/
Cleveland Agreement into retail wheeling. In
support, Cleveland states that upon the termi-
nation of Medical Center's current contract
with Cleveland Electric, Cleveland will he un-
dertaking the obligation to serve Medical
Center. Cleveland adds that it will have the
obligation to serve Medical Center even if the
power to be purchased from Ohio Power should
become unavailable. Additionally, Cleveland
states that the price Medical Center will be
charged is assured, regardless of the actual
sources from which Cleveland will purchase the
Cleveland Electric Answer in Docket No.
EL96-21-000 at p, 4.
Federal Energy Guidelines
771 ~-23-96
Commission Opinions, Orders and Notices
61,599
We reject Cleveland Electric's arguments
that the Commission is prohibited by section
212(h) of the FPA from ordering the requested
service for two reasons. First, we conclude that
section 212(h) does not preclude us from en-
forcing contractual commitments on file with
the Commission, Second, we conclude that,
even if section 212(h) applies, on the facts of
this case the requested transmission does not
violate 212(h),
There is nothing in the language of section
212(h) or its legislative history to indicate that
212(h) prohibits the Commission from issuing
any order under the EPA that is conditioned
upon or requi~es the transmission of electric
certain entities that will sell the electric energy
interpret section 212(h) to prohibit the Com-
mission from t~quiring public utilities to fulfill
authority, or instrumentality of a State or a
political subdivision);.., and
(B) much entity was providing electric ser-
vice to such ultimate consumer on [October
24, 1992] or would utilize transmission or
distribution facilities that it owns or controls
to deliver all such electric energy to such
electric consumer.
16 U.S.C. § § 824k(h) (1994).
Here, section 2t2(hXl) is not violated be-
cause the transmission will be over Cleveland
Electric's lines to Cleveland. Cleveland's sale to
Medical Center will be over Cleveland's 138 kV
line? Thus, this case simply does not involve
the transmission of electric energy by Cleve-
land Electric directly' to an ultimate consumer.
Nor is section 212(h)(2) violated. Under sec-
tlon 212(hX2), the Commission may not re-
quire the transmission of energy to, or for the
benefit of, an entity if such electric energy
would be sold by such entity directly to an
ultimate consumerg4 un/ess certain conditions
are met. Here, Cleveland meets those condi-
tions. Cleveland is an instrumentality of a
state or a political subdivision thereof and it
will utilize transmission or distrihutlola liras
that it owns or controls (i.e., the 138 kV line) to
deliver all the electric energy to Medical
Center.
Additionally, there is nothing in the facts of
this case that would be inconsistent with the
intent of Congress as expressed in EPAct's leg-
islative history. Congress was primarily con-
cerned that the Commission he prohibited from
issuing orders which r~quire wheeling where
the substance of the transaction amounts to
retail wheeling because the wholesale sale is, in
fact, a subterfuge intended to circumvent the
would violate section 212(h).
FERC Reportt
¶61,115
61,600
Cited as "76 FERC ¶ .... "
However, Congress also dearly intended that
wheeling to an entity which meets the cr/ter/a
in section 212(hX2XB) not be considered a pro-
hibited sham wholesale transaction? Thus, the
Commission may not order transmi~ion to pa-
per intermediaries used as a vehicle for end-
users to bypass their local utilities. Here, in
contrast, Cleveland clearly is not a paper en-
tity. It has for many years beth owned and
operated generation, transmission and distribu-
tion facilities, and competed w/th Cleveland
Electric.
Given the above findings, there is no need to
respond to Cleveland Electric's arguments that
Ohio power's sale to Cleveland Is not a legiti-
mate wholesale sale. We need only find that
the transmission service meets the criteria of
section 212(b), and we have done so.
In conclusion, we do not interpret ~ectlon
212(h) to preclude the Commission from eh-
¶61,115
harm would appear to be only monetary, and
that is not adequate justification for a stay?
Therefore, we find that Cleveland Electric
has failed to present sufficient grounds to grant
1. Cleveland also argues that Cleveland Elec-
tric is obligated under License Condition No, 3
Cleveland Electric to comply with the NRC
license conditions, regardless of whether Cleve-
land Electric bas filed the conditions with this
Cleveland Electric's transmission service agree-
ment provides a sufficient basis to decide this
dispute, we need not reach the issue of whether
the requested service al~o may be required
under NRC Licensing Condition No. 3.
2. Because we are dismissing as moot Cleve-
land Electric's petition (in Docket No.
EL96-9-000), we will dismiss Cleveland's re-
quest to consolidate the p~oceedings in Docket
No. EL96-9~00 and Docket No. EL96-21~00.
3. Cleveland Electric asks that, if we decide
installed to provide service to Medical
Center.''31 Cleveland Electric filed its petition
pr/or to the Issuance of the Open Access Rale.~
and prc~edures by which a public utility may
(2) of power generated by m' available to the other
771 ~23-96
Commission Opinions, Orders and Notices
61,601
seek to recover stranded coats?a Accordingly,
we will dismiss Cleveland Electric's request
without prejudice to making a filing in a sepa-
LILCO are hereby granted.
(C) Cleveland Electric's petition for a declar-
atory order is hereby denied, as discussed in
the body of this order.
(D) Cleveland's request for consolidation of
Docket Nos. EL96-9-000 and EL96-21-000 is
hereby dismissed as moot.
(E) Cleveland Electric's request for a stay is
hereby denied.
(F) Cleveland Electric's request for stranded
[¶el,lie]
LG&E-Westmoreland Southampton, Docket Nos. EL94-45-001 and
QF88-84-006
Order Granting Rehearing in Part and Denying Rehearing in Part, and An-
nouncing Policy Concerning Non-Compliance with the Commission's QF
Regulations
(Issued July 31, 1996)
Before Commissioners: Elizabeth Anne Moler, Chair; Vicky A. Bailey, James J.
Hoecker, William L. Massey, and Donald F. Santa, Jr.
On August 9, 1994, LG&E-Westmoreland
Southampton (Southampton) filed a request for
rehearing of the Commission's order issued in
this proceeding on July 7, 1994. LG&E-West-
moreland Southampton, 68 FERC 961,034
(1994). In that order, the Commission denied
the request by Southampton, the owner of a
topping-cycle cogeneration facility, for waiver
of the Commission's operating standard appli-
compliance with the Commission's QF regula-
tions during some past period of operation, and
in order to encourage respect for and compli-
ance with those regulations, we take this oppor-
tunity to announce a policy of general
application concerning the consequenc~es of
failing to retain QF status.
Background
We discuss the background of this proceeding
in detail in the previous order. In brief, South-
ampton owns a 62.6 MW topping-cycle
cogeneratlon facility located in Franklin, Vir-
ginia that failed to meet the Commission's op-
erating standard for qualifying cogeneration
facilities during calendar years 1991 and 1992.
Southampton previously was granted limited
waiver to excuse non-compliance for calendar
year 1991. In this proceeding, Southampton
requested an additional waiver to excuse non-
compliance for calendar year 1992. Southamp-
ton sought to justify a second waiver on the
fact that, among other things, the facility was
engaged in start-up and testing operations dur-
ing a portion of 1992, and that the third-party
plant operator mistakenly delivered (without
FERC Reports
¶61,116
61,694
Cited as "76 FERC 11 .... "
think it is unnecessary to address the FT-2 rate
~ts a negotiated rate. I would instead approve
this non-traditional, generally applicable rate
schedule under existing Commission prece-
dent.3
Shell proposes initial rates and sergices for a
new facility that will bring deep water OCS gas
onshore. Shell designed an FT-1 rate along the
lines of traditional two-part cost-based rates. It
also offers the non-traditional FT-2 rate sched-
ule. Because the FT-2 rate is deemed a 'negoti-
ated rate" under our Policy Statement. the
FT-1 rate becomes the de £acto recourse rate,
might m-gue for the uniqueness of this outcome.
However. this much seems apparent with re-
spect to the Commission's application of policy.
First. a negotiated rate may b~ a t~riff of
general applicability, not just an individual
deal negotiated against the backdrop of an
established fully allocated Pm-t 284 rate. Sec-
ond. th~ Commission is already prep~ to
approve negotiated terms and conditions, e~pe-
cially where (as in this case) there is no possi-
bility of degrsding the part 284 service of non-
participants in the negotiations (there are none
here).
In the final analysis, it is both unnecessary
and inadvisable to elasticize the negotiated
[¶ 61,127]
City of Palm Springs, California, Docket No. TX96-7-000
Order Denying Transmission Application
(Issued July 31, 1996)
Before Commissioners: Elizabeth Anne Moler, Chair; Vicky A. Bailey, James J.
Hoecker, William L. Massey, and Donald F. Santa, Jr.
On March 1, 1996, the City of Palm Springs,
California (Palm Springs) filed an application
Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. § §824j-k
212Cn).
a ~ee, e~g., Kern River Gas Transmission Corn.
party. 53 FI~RC ] 61.172 (1990) (permitting the nego-
tiation of initiaI service agreements differing from the
standard firm transportation service); Pacific Gas
¶61,127
.... *' Id. at p. 61,241 (emphasis
771 8-23-96
Commission Opinions, Orders and Notices
61,695
ties, and metering equipment at the delivery
points to Palm Spring~' customers.2
Palm Springs states that it wants the re-
1 61.073 (19~S).
FERC Reports
'Ii* 61,127
61,696
Cited as "76 FERC ¶ .... "
by means of which Palm Springs provides retail
electric service to municipal facilities, as well
as a limited number of other customers, and
an artLqcial barrier to Palm Sprin~s' entry into
continue Edisae's retail electric business in
to Palm Springs, not f~ custome~ directly,
¶$1,127
and therefore, ~vould not a~fect the authority of
the California Public Utilities Commission
(California Commission) regarding retail
whe~¥mg.
With regard to stranded costs, Palm Springs
argues that the requested order should protect
Palm Springs from allegedly antlcompetltive
recovery of straladed costs by Edison, and
maintains that the Commission is the proper
forum for addressing the recoverability of such
costs. Palm Springs argues that nothing in the
Franchise Ordintmce or in California law enti-
tles Edison to expect that palm Springs will
not enter into competition with it to provide
power (other than Palm Springs' existing 12 kV
Commission Opinions, Orders and Notices
61,697
line), will not build new facilities to serve new
customers, and will not assume an obligation to
serve. Ed/~on argues that meters do not deliver
power, they merely measure it; and even if
meters did deliver power, Edison woald already
have wheeled power to the ultimate consumer
by the time that it reached the Palm Springs'
meter. Thus, Palm Springs would not be dellv-
erlng power to Palm Springs' customers.
Edison argues that neither the Franchise Or-
dinance nor any statutory condemnation provi-
sion gives Palm Springs authority over
Edison's distribution facilities within Palm
Springs.
Additionally. Edison asserts that if Palm
Springs' were technically eligible for the ~er-
vice, the Commission should deny the applica-
tion on the independent grounds that ordering
~ervice would not be in the public interest.
Edison argues that Palm Springs' plan would
evade the California Commission's restructur-
ing program in California, and by merely in-
stalling meters Palm Springs attempts to
remove its constituents from the California
Commission's plan that provides for, among
other things, stranded cost recovery. Edison
argues that if Palm Springs' plan is approved
by this Commission, the states would have no
control over direct access and virtually all in-
vestor-owned utility assets would be subject to
Commission regulation. It argues that granting
Palm Springs' request would so severely under-
mine the California Commission's decision that
a violation of section 212(8) would result.$
Edison also asserts that Palm Springs' propc-
sal is not pro-competitive but seeks to avoid
stranded costs. Consequently, Edison asks that
if the Commission orders transmission service,
zation (TURN), and School Project {'or the
and answer to protests that supports the appli-
cation. Roy Lippi (Lippi) filed untimely collec-
tions of citizens' letters compiled from "Letters
to the Editor," the "Desert Sun," Palm
Springs, California supporting the application.
Heartland Energy Services (Heartland) filed
a motion to intervene in support of the filing
and a teclueat for expedited treatment in sup~
port of Palm Springs' application, Heartland
argue~ that: (Il the request is not a sham
whole~ale tran~actlon in that Palm Springs
could simply build its own system or condemn
Edison's facilities and in both cases qualify for
transmission service; (2) the request is pro-
competitive; (3) from a technical perspective
there is no difference between service at 2 kV
and service at 500 kV other than the identifica-
tion of cost of that service; (4) the only costs to
be considered stranded are those related to
bio.
or a/ter December 20, 1995, whether they take
FERC Re,om
¶ 61,127
61,698
Cited as "76 FERC ¶ .... "
other options; and (7) ordering transmission
here would violate section 212(h) since it would
directly interfere with the California Commis-
sion's timetable for direct access and stranded
Lastly. the California Commission argues
that oedering the requested transmission would
transition charge as determined by the Califor-
Consequently, the California Commission ar-
and would federalize the recovery of stranded
¶61,127
ute and is a sham whole~ale transaction. EEI
through Palm Springs' use of meters that dupli-
cate Edison's meters to facilitate a retail sale
to EEl's former retail customers. EEl argues
that a meter is not a distribution facility and
utilities must have an opportunity to r~cover
stranded costs. EEI argues that Palm Springs
is attempting to avoid the existing managed
state regulatory and legislative transition to
increased retail electric competition in Califor-
nia, which includes stranded cost recover,.
the requirements for municipalization imposed
under state law.
United Illuminating Company (United Illu-
minating) and Rochester Gas and Electric Cor-
poration (Rochester) filed timely motions to
intervene and protests adopting EEI's argu-
ments above.
Virginia Electric and Power Company
(VEPCO). Atlantic City Electric Company
(Atlantic). Da~ton Power and Light Company
(Da~ton), Texas Utilities Electric Company
(Texas Utilities), Central Maine Power Com-
pany (Central Maine), and Niagara Mohawk
power Corporation (Niagara Mohawk) filed
timely motions to intervene and protests as-
and Toledo). Duke Power Company (Duke).
ments of section 212(hX2XB).
GPU Service Corporatinn (GPU Service)
stating that Palm Springs bears none of the
Springs ns a bona fide dlstribut~ of energy
erative Association (NRECA) filed a timely
Federgl Enerigy Guidelines
Commission Opinions, Orders and Notices
61,699
F~CR~o~
to pay higher costs; and (5) Palm Springs'
muni-lite plan may produce higher electric
rates than would otherwise result under the
California Commission's r~structuring pro-
gram, or may result in an additional tax bur-
den.
to receive bundled retail service, ~ho~ld be con-
¶ 61,127
61,700
Cited as "76 FERC ¶ .... "
serve the same loads. Finally, Palm Springs
states that t~e Commission should provide
guidance as to what facilities would satisfy the
~q ulrements of section 212(hX2){B).
Edison filed a response to Palm Springs' re.
ply to various motions. Edison argues that
under Palm Springs' definition, "facilities"
would include contracts, accounts, and records
notwithstanding concern expressed in the legis-
lative history that paper entities would try to
claim eligibility for transmissiotx service to
which tl~y are not entitled. Ediso~ also asserts
that Palm Springs' definition of "deliver" to
legislative history, which indicates that an eh-
entity to another while owning no physical
facilities is a sham wholesaler. Edison states
that under Its retail tariff the point of delivery
is complete prior to the electricity reaching the
meter. Edison argues that under Palm Springs'
logic, it could buy a wall socket inside a house
and still meet the PPA test for ownership of
facilities thnt deliver power because until the
is not delivered. Edison argues that Congress
owned utilities providing distribution service
and electric sales will become Commission reg-
ulated because servic~ formerly provided at
retail will be deemed a wholgsale transaction.
With respect to stranded costs, Edison
gues that Palm Springs' proposal if legal,
wo~ld result in chaos; there would be two corn-
Under rule 214 of the Commission's Rules of
Practice ~nd Procedure. the timgly, unopposed
notice of intervention of the Califo~nin Com-
mission and the timely, unoppos~ motions to
Inter~ene of F~lison, California Water,
cahella Valley, ERror. Cltlc'~ Comortium, port-
land G~leral, ELCON, TURN, SPURR and
RlgMAC, Heartland, NARUC, EEl. United
luminating, Rochester, VEPCO, Atlantic, Day-
ton, Texas Utilities, Central Maine, Niagara
Mohawk, Southern, Florida power, Carolina
Power. Cleveland and Toledo, Duke, Common-
wealth Edison, LILCO, GPU Service, NRECA,
PG&E. NYSEG, Burbank, Cahuilla Indians,
Southern Indiana, California Manufacturers,
Management Group, Electric Clearinghouse,
Illinova. lES Utilities, San Die~o, San Fran-
cisco, Sierra Pacific. NCPA, El Paso, and
PSE&G serve to make them parties to this
proceeding. We will grant the untimely mo-
tions to intervene of ELCON, Lippl, Nevada
U.S.C. § 824k(g) {
16 U.S.C. § 824k(h) (1994) (emphasis added),
Fedm'M En~rg~ Guldalln~
Commission Opinions, Orders and Notices
61,701
Ana/ysfs
Our decision in this case turns on the Com-
missieo's interpretation of section 212(h). This
section limits the Commission's otherwise
broad authority under section 211 to order a
transmitting utility to provide transmission
service to an eligible customer, except in lim-
ited circumstances identified in section
2120aX2). The extent of these exceptions are at
issue in this case.
The parties have made numerous arguments
as to why the transmission sought by palm
Springs would either satisfy or violate section
212(h). We do not need to address many of
these arguments because, even assuming that
the other statutory hurdles have been over-
come, Palm Springs would not meet either of
the requirements of section 212(hX2XB). Pahn
Springs was not providing electric service on
October 24, 1992, to all the ultimate consumers
for whom it seeks the transmiadoo of electric
energy in its application.6 Nor, as discussed
below, are we satisfied that Palm Springs
"would utilize transmission or distribution fa-
cilities that it owns or controls to deliver MI
such electric energy to such electric consumer."
(Emphasis added.)
Section 2120aX2) prohibits the Commission
from ordering transmission service "to, or for
the benefit of, an entity if such electric energy
would be sold by such entity directly to an
ultimate consumer," unless beth conditions of
subsection 212(hX2XA) and (B) are satisfied.
The central question in this case is wbether
Palm Springs meets either of the circumstances
in 212(hX2XB), i.e., whether it was "providing
electric service" to the consumers it seeks to
serve ma the date of enactmoat of this subsec-
tion [October 24, 1992] or "would utilize tran~
customers on October 24, 1992, wheeling fcc
the benefit of those customers is not at issue
here. Customers currently being served by
Palm Springs off of Palm Springs' existing 12
ky line include several municipal facilities and
a limited number of commercial entities associ-
ated with the municipal facilities (for example,
Palm Springs provides service to beth the air-
port and the airlines). Indeed, Edison has indi-
cated that it is willing to wheel power for the
benefit of these customers? Rather, the issue
before us concerns whether Edison under sec-
tion 211 can be compelled to wheel power so
that Palm Sprin~s may sell power to poten-
tially all of the nearly 40,000 consumers in
Palm Springs that are currently retail custom-
ers of Edison. For reasons described below, we
conclude that we cannot compel Edison to do
so.
In support of its arguments that wheeling for
the benefit of new customers satisfies
2120aX2XB), Palm Sprin~ argues that by in-
stalling duplicate meters between the distcibu-
tion facilities of Edison and the main circuit
breaker of each electric consumer in palm
Springs electing to receive service from the
City, it will in fact be utilizing transmission or
distribution facilities that it owns or controls to
deliver ail such electric energy to such electric
consumers.8 However, we cannot agree that
owning duplicate meters which simply measure
the flow of power from Edison's distribution
system to the retail customer meets the statu-
tory requirement.
Congress did not define what constitute~
"distribution facilities" or what it meant by
facilities that an entity would "utilize ... to
deliver ail such electric energy to such electric
consumer" for purposes of ~ction 212(hX2XB).
This is understandable because the character of
particular facilities and their use is a question
of fact that may vary from case to case. In the
face of this statutory ambiguity, we turn to
other factors, including the Commission's prac-
ficai understanding of the industry and legisla-
Speln~ appUcafloo, e~ait~t L. An am~lysis prepaid
by a pmh~ ~ln~ cm~ait~nt estlmnted thnt the total
App. L
FERC Repor~
¶ 61,127
61,702
Cited as "76 FFRC ¶ .... "
771 &23-96
tire history to suggest an appropriate
interpretation.
mate consumers involves the situation of a
I} 61,127
Federal Enerly Guidelines
Commission Opinions, Orders and Notices
61,703
138 Co~g. Rec. S17613 (daily ed. Oct. 8. 1992)
(statement of ~en. Johnston) (emphasis
added).11
The Conference Report requi~ that the
transmission service authorized by the
FERC order may not lead to retail wheeling,
regardless of the terminolo~' used in the
transmis..~ion request or FleRC order. Thus,
the FERC has no authority to order or au-
thorize a utility to provide transmission ser-
vices where the practical result of the order
will he to bypass the utility's retail service
and deliver wholesale power to a retail cus-
tomer. The FERC must ensure that, in a
particular fact patton in an individual case.
it d~es not allow or approve transactions that
added)?
t995), mad//~ed. D. 96-014)09 Oan,20. 199~), 16~
PUR4~h 1 (1996).
¶ 61,127
61,704 Cited as"76 FERC ¶ .... " 7n ~-ge
In Florida Municipal Power Agency v. Flor-
ida Power & Light Company,15 we determined
that, as a general matter, the availability of
transmission service enhances competition in
power markets by increasing the power supply
options of buyers and the power sales options of
sellers and lends to lower costs to consumer~.
We have also said that, so long as the transmit-
ting utility receives full and fair compensation
finding in past cases is outweighed by a c~n-
Si}rings residents to switch power suppliers im-
mediately would evade the decision of the Call-
competition over several years and to impose a
competition transition charge for rec~verlng
the associated retail stranded costs. Indeed, the
vice appear~ to be to avoid the competition
Commission. An order by this Commission un-
lng Palm Springs' application would wrongly
dissatisfied with the decision of the state regu-
deny palm Springs' application.
The Commi~on orders:
Palm Springs' application is hereby denied.
¶61,127
mined that this so-called "municipalizatien-
lite" is not permissible under the Federal
Power Act.
I believe that this is a close decision. Palm
Until now, the Commission has always found
that transmission service under section 211 is
in the public inte~st, provided the transmit-
unreasonable impairment of reliability. Florida
Municipal Power Agency v. Florida power &
(1993). However, the majority in this case,
quite inexplicably, warns that any future re-
quest for section 211 transmission service
which, unlike the Palm Springs' proposal, satis-
//es the requirements of ~ection 212(h) may
nevertheless be denied as contrary to the public
interest, l~vidently, this cotfld happen if such a
market access initiative: (I) does not conform
to the timetable of the state's retail competi-
tion plan, in this instance the phase-in of di~ct
retail access by the California Public Service
Commission (CPUC); (2) *'evades" the state's
retail stranded cost recovery plan, in this in-
stance the CPUC's "eompotition transition
change' (CTC); or (3) would otherwise under-
Federal Energy Guidelines
775 9-1996
Commission Opinions, Orders and Notices
61,705
mine ~ c~ntradiet 'a state commission's deci-
sims in these circumstance~" Moreover, the
m~ioclty c~cludes, without substantiation,
that Palm Springs' "primary ecooomic motive"
far its proposal is not to obtain lower rates or
additional power supply options, as the City
plausibly contends, but simply to avoid the
CTC. For the following reasons, I helieve the~e
findings are ill-advised.
With respect to its f'u~t l-mding (i.e., that the
Pahn Springs' plan evades the GPUG's decision
to phase-la competitima over several years), the
majority registers its blanket support for any
timetable for competition proposed or adopted
by state regulatar~ This level of deference is
problematic on its face. Under it, state retail
competition plans, even if tentative or unre-
viewed, effectively trump the lawful use of
state municlFmliTatiml law alld section 211 to
gain transmission access. The majority thus
sanctions and perhaps invites purposeful and
lengthy delays la implementing even legiti-
mate plans to obtain market acces~ That may
economically penalize currently captive cus-
tomers.
With respect to the majority's related find-
ing that the Palm Springs* plan would evade
the CTC and is therefore not in the public
inte~st, the PMm Spt/rigs order ignores the
state's ability to impose an exit fee on depart-
ing customers and this Commission's own hold-
ing in Order No. 8~8 that it would he the
"primary forum" for dealing with stranded
costs resulting from new municipalizations,a I
do not believe that Palm Springs' possible eva-
sims of the CTC is tantamount to avoidance of
stranded c~st recovery altogether, although the
majority appears to regard them as indistin-
guishable. It is already clear that the CPUC
has not hesitated to act in other instances to
prevent departing customers from avoiding the
CTC.s
The majority's third indictment of plans like
Palm Springs' (i.e., that "an order undermining
or contradicting a state commission's decision
in these circumstances is not in the public
interest") is similarly questionable. In my earl-
mation, this amounts to a premature blanket
endorsement of the CPUC's restructuring plan,
the closely related bulk power aspects of which
are pending before this agency.
including through municipalization, the re-
sponsibility for stopping it in the public inter-
section 212(g) which fences this Commission
clines to make a finding that the Palm Springs'
III.
We should defer to state regulation, as ap-
propriate, consistent with Order No. 888.
Moreover, I respect the CPUC's hard work as
well as the achievements of the California elec-
tric power community in formulating a restruc-
turing plan. But, it is clearly too early for the
kind of blessing that the majority bestows on
their work product. It seems to me that, at this
early stage in restructuring, the public interest
is best served by an openness to innovation--
from .whatever source. If there are problems
with those innovations, such as the violation of
section 212(h) in this case, the Commission's
case-specific analysis of them will bring those
problems to light. Similarly, if analysis reveals
a potential economic dislocation or even an
express purpose to evade regulation, the Com-
mission or state regulatory agencies will he able
to avoid or remedy those difficulties. But, it is
very troubling to me that the majority suggests
that it will deny an otherwise lawful service
request because it fails to conform to the
preconceptions and schedulcs underlying even
incipient and untested state restructuring pro-
grams. I submit that this places primary value
on market regimentation and predictability,
not innovation. Or, as Alfred Kahn has wisely
observed: "regulation confronted with competi-
tion will have a systematic tendency either to
suppress it .... or to orchestrate it and control
the results it produces." The majority confirms
his observation.
I must therefore dissent to the public inter-
est part of the Palm Springs order.
FERC Reports ·
¶61,1~?
790 1-24-97
Commission Opinions, Orders and Notices
62,543
(Issued December 31, 19915)
By Direction of the Commission: Lois D. Cashell, Secretary.
Reference: Twenty-Ninth Revised Sheet Nos.
S0 and 51 to FERC Gas Tariff, Fifth Revised
Volume No. 1.
The Commission accepts Northern Natural
Gas Company's (Northern) November 27 fil-
ing, to be effective January 1, 1997 and dis-
misses Northern's request for waiver of the
notice requirements as unnecessary,
On November 27, 1996, Northern filed the
tariff sheets referenced above in Docket No.
RP97-1114300 to revise the "gas supply re-
alignment" (GSR) reservation surcharge for
Rate Schedules TF and 'IFF from $0.435 per
MMBtu to $0.446 per MMBtu for the recovery
of its past unrecovered GSR costs. The filing is
consistent with the terms of Northern's Global
Settlement and its immediate effective tariff.
Northern requested waiver to obtain the ef-
fective date of January 1, 1997. The referenced
tariff sheets were submitted on November 27,
1996, which will allow a thirty-day notice pe-
riod before the requested January I effective
date; therefore, waiver is unnecessary.
Notices of intervention and unopposed
timely filed motions to intervene are granted
[¶ 61,355]
Suffolk County Electrical Agency, Docket No. TX96-4-000
Proposed Order Directing Transmission Services and Ordering Further Proce-
dures
(Issued December 31, 19~6)
Before Commissioners: Elizabeth Anne Moler, Chair; Vicky A. Bailey, James J.
Hoecker, William L. Massey, and Donald F. Santa, Jr.
On January 17. 1996. pursuant to sections
211 and 212 of the Federal Power Act (FIPA).
as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 1992
(Energy Policy Act). 16 U.S.C. §§824'~824k
(1994). Suffolk County Electrical Agency (Suf-
folk) applied for an order from the Commission
requiring Long Island Lighting Company
(LILCO) to provide firm network transmission
service, as well as certain andllary, billing and
collection services. Suffolk seeks such services
to allow it to purchase, for rec~ale to residential,
commercial and industrial customers, lower-
cost power to be supplied to Stlffolk by North-
east Utilities (NLD, Enron Power Marketing,
Inc. (Enron), and o~her po~er supplle~ that
Suffolk may designate.
In this proposed order, we order LILCO to
provide transmission services to the extent nec-
essary to accommodate Suffolk'$ proposed sales
FER¢ Report~
of power to customers to which it was provid-
ing electric service on the date of enactment
(October 24, 1992) of the Energy Policy Act.
We also order further procedures to establish
the rate% terms a~d. conditions o1 such ~ervices.
We will deny at this time, without prejudice,
Suffolk's application to the extent it seeks
~xansmi~on ser~ice~ from LILCO to accom-
modate power sales to customers it was not
serving on the date of enactment of the Energy
Policy Act. We affor~ Suffolk the opportunity
to file a new application with the Commission
identifying with specificity the facilities it in-
tends to own or control after the date of Com-
mission action, to the extent it seeks
transmission service to accommodate power
bet 24, 1992.
¶ 61,355
Ä